SHAH ALAM: Investigations into Gempita and Adnan deals. Two company officials have been remanded by the Anti Corruption Commission in connection into investigations into the supply of equipment destined for military vehicles.
From the Star.
PUTRAJAYA: Graft investigators are to question more people in a further probe into alleged bribery in awarding projects to supply equipment for military armoured vehicles valued at RM17mil.
Investigators are not discounting more arrests as they delve deeper into the case, following the arrests and remand of two company officials who they believed had accepted bribes to approve the projects.
The two are the company’s chief executive officer as well as its chief financial officer who were arrested at the Malaysian-Anti Corruption Commission headquarters when they were ordered to be present to have their statement recorded.
The 45-year-old CEO was arrested at 10pm on Sunday while the CFO, a 53-year-old woman, was detained later at 11.50pm on the same day.
It is interesting to note that Malaysiakini on the same issue, reported that the CEO is 53 and the CFO as 45. As reported above it is likely more people will be rope to help in the probe.
— Malaysian Defence
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This incident could be used to really review the real cost of the Gempita, minus all the R&D and Industrial preparation costs, to get a better deal for future Gempita Batch 2.
Agreed. Am looking at this positively. The CEO and CFO accepted the bribes but this doesn’t discount the fact the Gempita, for one, is a very good 8X8. So am also eagerly waiting for a Batch 2 (if that’s possible) to be better prices sans any bribe or gift money!
Reply
They are being investigated, period, a court need to find them guilty first before we could say they are guilty of bribes.
It will be good to lessen down the 20% commision seeker but will never totally rid out of it.
Good news. Currently rhe money if really given eould be included as cost n our defence forces are buying equipment with an inflated price. Retender for the supply n I am sure the cost would be cheaper sans any grease money
this will be interesting to see…even Adnan deal also got probe…
@Lee Yoke Meng
Grease money will only go from right pocket to left pocket.
Could kill any further purchase of Adnans and Gempitas though. The current govt aversion to arms deal and bribes is too damn high.
@ wan
Adnan is too lightly armoured for future conflicts. So no to more adnans. Would love to have brand new tracked IFVs to replace the adnan with higher armour protection. But the adnan is still quite new and replacing this is beyond what the government can afford now.
IMO we should continue buying a few more gempitas, to create a totally wheeled IFV force with the 4 Briged Mekanize. A number of around 400 (so that means another 150 or so for batch 2) would be good for 3x mechanised infantry battalions and 4x armoured cavalry regiments.
Pendekars and adnans/mifv then used for a new all tracked armoured brigade (probably convert 1st infantry brigade into an armoured brigade as planned by the army around 2013).
Wont it be better if we structured the whole army like usmc marine expeditionary brigade with some tweeks except for the 10th para?
1x mbt/light tank company
1x armored reconnaissance company
– uses the av8
3x infantry battalion
– uses the lipanbara & utility vehicle (vamtac & gk-m1)
1x artillery battalion
– 1 155mm self-propelled howitzer company
– 2 105mm towed howitzer companies
1x air defense company
– 6x rapid ranger on vamtac
1x engineer company
1x reme company
1x signal company
1x supply company
1x medical company
1x mp company
And better if maybe under each brigade, they can get an attached aviation squadron made up of 4x utility heli (nuri or h225m in the future)
Just my sekupang. No need for having wheeled mechanized or tracked mechanized infantry. Standardized for every infantry brigades.
What do you think?
@ nihd
We have like a dozen brigades. We cannot afford to and have no need for all brigades to be on wheels/tracks. Our army as a whole is basically a defensive formation, not an expeditionary offensive force like the USMC.
Some items, like artillery and most cavalry (armoured recce) forces are attached at divisional, not brigade levels.
IMO with limited resources that we have, this is what we can do.
– Maintain 10PARA as our main strategic response unit.
– from our 5 available divisions, 1x division to be a completely mechanized with MBT/AV8/ADNAN/MRAP. For 1st and 5th division in sarawak and sabah, each to have 1x cavalry regiment with AV8 and 1x mechanized battalion with MRAP.
– Adopt USMC system of “pre-positioned equipment” in sabah. Probably 1 squadron/company worth of Pendekar/adnan/AV8 stored in sabah and available for any mechanized/armoured units to use. Ready hardwares in location but no need for additional manpower to be sourced. This reduces reaction time and reduces the need to deploy equipment from locations in peninsular malaysia.
http://www.candp.marines.mil/Organization/MAGTF/Marine-Corps-Pre-Positioning-Program-Norway-MCPP-N/
– the division to be fully mechanized/armoured would be the 3rd Division, tasked with defending the lower half of the peninsular. This is how it would look
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/latest-gempita-variant-to-enter-service/#comment-373426
@Wan
“current govt aversion to arms deal and bribes is too damn high.”
What do you mean, “and bribes”?
@Nihd
The USMC are basically elite light infantry. Organisation is not the main issue; equipment and training is. We have nowhere near their level of support weapons, for example. And that will cost money.
Thanks for the replies. Just humor my ideas. I like the discussions.
What if instead of having 12 infantry brigades, with 5 divisions, we only have 4 divisions with 8 infantry brigades plus one identical brigade for capital defense? Excluding the ceremonial units and 10th para.
For example,
1st division – Sarawak
2nd division – Northern Peninsular
3rd division – Southern Peninsular
4th division – Sabah
1 infantry brigade – Capital area
As i can see the combat elements we need, in total
9x armored tank companies
9x armored recon companies
27x infantry battalions
9x field artillery battalions
9x low level air defense companies
If we really need to save money, i dont think our infantry battalions should use av8 and adnans. They should only use the vamtacs, gk-m1, handalan trucks, lipanbara and other utility vehicles.
All those av8 is for division headquarters battalions, brigade headquarters companies and armored recon companies. Maybe we can just retire the adnans.
I believe a standardized and balanced army in a whole, both west and east commands are essential. Rather than having a strong unit at one theater of operation but weaker in other areas (in terms of equipments).
Plus, if any units are transported from their area of operations to other area, training and readiness will be easier as all units are more or less the same. At the same time, logistical and maintenance requirements will be the same.
These ideas does exclude the factors of geographical differences in our country which affect the operational requirement of our army.
What do you guys think? Just my sekupang.
@Nihd
Do you know what is the role of our Armed Forces? Do you know what is the role of USMC?
The USMC is primarily an offensive force, aimed to go anywhere, open an assault, secure the beachhead/forced entry point, and breakthru once that is secured together with the regular US Army forces once they had landed. Which is why their equipment, support, combat philosophy, & strategies are geared towards that goal.
For our Armed Forces to do that, we need to realign them 180 degrees around from a defensive stance to an offensive one.
Can we do that? Should we do that? What are the repercussions from alarmed neighbours? This should be thought out.
Can i have some explaination on why is my lengthy reply to nihd is censored?
Reply
Some people are using the posts here to promote themselves as experts to Mindef
@ marhalim
If you think that of me, really i have no interest in posting my thoughts other than here. I would not have maintained my 10++ years of anonymous. If i want to be an expert to mindef, i would have used all my thoughts to do multiple PhDs at local universities.
Yes, i want to influence our defence policies for the better, and no i dont want to and have no desire to be working directly for mindef or in any industries related to defence.
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Who said it was you?
@…
I too have seen your posts spread elsewhere, but not accredited of course.
Rather than getting a totally new vehicle to replace the Adnan; what Deftech should be doing is working with the army to see if the Adnan’s protection levels can be significantly increased to provide added protection against auto cannons and shoulder fired weapons without major changes to the vehicle – granted, extra weight will strain the engine and gearbox and changes here might be required but using the same design and maintaining (if possible) whatever commonality can be achieved will simplify things.
Getting a totally new vehicle will only add to the already large logistical/support footprint and we’ll be left again with a bit of everything (with the MIFV the army will have 3 types of tracked IFVs, if a totally new design is bought) but not enough of anything. Someone mentioned the AV8 as being “very good”. It’s not a bad vehicle but the point to remember is neither the AV8 or the Adnan were selected because of technical merits over competitors but because of politics. The fact that the Turks are Muslim and that they were willing to allow licensed assembly played a big part. With the Adnan, some of the stuff that went on it was selected not by the army but by DEFTECH.
An accurate way to describe the army is that a small part (having the needed training and equipment) is geared for conventional manoeuvre type ops; with the remainder (despite new equipment and the focus towards external threats) still more suited for low intensity ops.
As far as equipment goes there is a very fine line towards what constitutes a “defensive” weapon as opposed to an “offensive” one. A MLRS or a 155mm piece, although generally considered as “offensive” weapons can just as easily have “defensive” applications.
As older gen officers (those who made there careers during the Emergency when the army was a lightly equipped organisation geared for internal security) retire; they will be replaced (already happening) by a younger generation of officers who from Day One will view things differently and will have a better understanding of what is needed; in equipment, mindset, doctrine and organisation. Like any other army; the Malaysian army is one big bureaucracy bogged down by red tape and at times can be resistant to change. Career minded officers will want to reach as high as they can and will be mindful of doing or saying anything that can jeopardise their careers.
The ability and willingness of new generation officers to express their ideas and to experiment with change and the support they receive from the top will determine how effective the army is as a learning organisation that can keep up with the times.
@ azlan
” Deftech should be doing is working with the army to see if the Adnan’s protection levels can be significantly increased to provide added protection against auto cannons and shoulder fired weapons without major changes to the vehicle ”
If it is possible, it would have already been done by others. Against RPG? Probably can be done as most anti RPG add ons are lightweight type. Significantly against auto cannons and other shoulder fired weapons? Not possible due to limited max gross weight limit (around 14 tons) of the platform. The adnan has arguably the best add on armor (against bullets, not anti RPG type) of any M113 series, and most upgrades available is to actually increase the protection to similar levels to the adnan. Remember, even to fit the 120mm mortar, an extra pair of roadwheels need to be added to support the weight. Only thing left to be done to the adnans are reset, and limited modernisation of equipments, otherwise to be used as is.
“An accurate way to describe the army is that a small part (having the needed training and equipment) is geared for conventional manoeuvre type ops; with the remainder (despite new equipment and the focus towards external threats) still more suited for low intensity ops.”
I would say that our having acquired items that have a role in high tempo ops, does not indicate we are shifting to an emphasis on such high tempo ops, even for the units concerned.
That would require making changes to our army-wide concept of operations, restructuring and units large and small, rather than giving units a new toy or simply dropping in new equipment as replacements for old.
“Career minded officers will want to reach as high as they can and will be mindful of doing or saying anything that can jeopardise their careers.”
Before one can do anything differently, one has to have an interest and has to care. Unfortunately, there are many people who simply don’t care.
I also don’t get the sense that we’ve reached a level of maturity that tolerates disagreements.
….. – If it is possible, it would have already been done by others. Against RPG? Probably can be done as most anti RPG add ons are lightweight type. Significantly against auto cannons and other shoulder fired weapons”
Of course it’s possible and has been done : how much is one willing to spent, what weight penalty is one willing to incur and is it worth the effort?
Lightweight chicken/ bar/cage armour is useful in that in addition to prematurely detonating the warheads of shoulder fired weapons (not just RPGs), can to some extent mitigate the effects of auto cannons and ATGWs (the same principle applies to the Schurzen panels the Germans had in the 1940’s). We’ve also seen this in Iraq and Yemen.
….. – “The adnan has arguably the best add on armor (against bullets, not anti RPG type) of any M113 series, and most upgrades available is to actually increase the protection to similar levels”
You sound very sure but are you correct? How does it compare against the Bionix and various upgrades performed on Israeli
M-113s – similar or better? You sure Adnan really provides 360 protection up to 14.5mm?
AM – “I would say that our having acquired items that have a role in high tempo ops, does not indicate we are shifting to an emphasis on such high tempo ops, even for the units concerned”
We started shifting emphasis years ago and to be expected such things take time. The ability of the army to conduct fast paced high intensity manoeuvre type ops is limited to a handful of units.
Although these units may have the needed hardware and training however; their command, logistical and engineering elements may not be up to the job. To be expected; given we are a small army with a limited budget, no experience in state on state conflict and a very long internal security tradition.
Of course a cynic can ask what is the possibility of us engaging in high temp ops with anyone and that even if we had the ability; do we actually have the stocks of ammo, fuel and other vitals to sustain high tempo ops.
AM – I also don’t get the sense that we’ve reached a level of maturity that tolerates disagreements“
Maybe so but to be fair there are similar issues in Tier 1 armies too; armies with far more resources than us, which are far better learning organisations and which have a longer tradition. We were at our peak in the 1970’s and 1980’s when we had a real threat and when junior level officers and other ranks had to display a lot of the independence and initiative needed for small unit jungle ops.
What is the situation now? Have things improved from the 1990’s when things went downwards with manpower quality? Sure it doesn’t determine their ability to do their job but the bulk of the rank and file can’t even speak basic English. During joint exercises with figuring troops this can be a problem and an embarrassment. I know we still have a “bodek” culture where saying the wrong thing to a superior or doing the wrong thing (which may be the “right” thing) can screw up one’s prospect for career advancement.
Creating an army which from bottom up; can think independently, take responsibility and show initiative with minimal guidance and control from the top; takes time, lots of practice and is dependent on the quality of manpower, cultural issues and various other factors.
Even the British and American armies faced lots of issues embracing the idea of “mission command”. One can argue that apart from the Germans (the ones who pioneered it) the only ones who have really embraced and understood the concept of “mission command” are the Israelis.
@ azlan
” Of course it’s possible and has been done ”
It cannot be uparmoured against cannon fire. Period.
It is not a budgetary limitation, it is technical (specifically maximum sustainable weight of the design) problem.
The max level of armor it can sustain is to absorb 14.5mm machine gun fire. Absorbing 20mm cannon fire? No can do. Unless you are converting them to a static pillbox.
Bar armor is only useful for HEAT type missiles, which it damages the thin casing or short circuit the fuse. Not useful at all for kinetic rounds like bullets or cannon shells.
Bionix is a totally different platform to the m113.
Israeli Zelda proforated armor is mainly for RPG protection.
So why does current IFV weigh 20-40tons? To have the armor required to withstand cannon fire. M113 max weight is barely 15tons and the suspension and engine cannot support more than that. Even the 35ton FNSS harimau tank can only withstand 30mm shell in front arc.
….. – “It cannot be uparmoured against cannon fire. Period”
Really – period?
I never said we should or can uparmour Adnan to wistand against cannon fire.
This is what I said. Look at the choice of words I used – “if the Adnan’s protection levels can be significantly increased to provide added protection against auto cannons”.
I did say however that cage armour can mitigate to some extent the effects of auto cannon fire and if you noticed; the main theme of the discussion was on cage armour to defend against shoulder fired (not just RPGs) weapons. By “added protection” I meant the possibility of perhaps up armouring the frontal arc and cage armour, which will not totally stop a KE auto cannon round but may slow it or provide at least an extra layer of protection.
…… – Bionix is a totally different platform to the m113…..”
Adnan is also a “totally different” platform but like Bionix; both were based on the M113’s design.
….. – “Absorbing 20mm cannon fire? No can do”
The problem is nobody suggested that. The talk was mainly on bar armour to prematurely detonate shoulder fired weapons.
As I’ve mentioned in the past (feel free to go through previous posts as you usually do) that to uparmour any IFV (track or wheel) against auto cannons would require a super heavy IFV. Like what the Europeans are doing and what the IDF has long done with the Azarit (converted from a T-54/55 chassis).
I
Adnan can withstand 14.5mm machine gun fire.
You asked if “if the Adnan’s protection levels can be significantly increased to provide added protection against auto cannons”.
What is your definition of “significant”? What other calibers are there after 14.5mm russian machine gun ammo? So what is significant for you above the ability of the adnan to withstand 14.5mm?
What is your definition of “cannon”? What is the smallest cannon round after 14.5mm machine gun?
….. – “Adnan can withstand 14.5mm machine gun fire.”
According to the OEM Adnan has all round protection up to 14.5mm AP HMG fire but OEMs often stretch the facts a bit. Ask around about it’s all round protection level. You also overlook the minor but vital fact that the turret (to be expected) does not have the same level of protection.
…… -What is your definition of “significant“
Various possibilities including up armouring the frontal arch or the turret are. Like I said, if it can be done, without changes in other areas to compensate for the extra weight. Bar armour (although intended to premature detonate shoulder fire weapons) can also mitigate the effects of auto cannon rounds. Naturally whether it’s a HE or KE round and where it hits will also determine things.
…… What is your definition of “cannon”
Never mind my definition; the proper definition of what constitutes a “cannon” is its role and design; not so much its calibre.
Let me put in a way where there’s no room for cherry picking or ambiguity –
The Adnan’s projection level can be significantly increased to provide protection against shoulder fired weapons (not only RPGs per see) by the addition of bar/cage/chicken armour, which can be added without extra weight and major modifications. Although the primary purpose of
bar/cage/chicken armour is against shoulder fired rounds; to a lesser extent (depending on circumstances) it can also mitigate the effects of not only auto cannon rounds but also ATGWs.
If possible, without the need for any changes or major weight penalties; a “possibility” (not a “certainty” – I have to add this caveat as you might jump on it) is the fitting of light weight ceramic add on panels/applique on certain areas of the vehicle; to protect against auto cannon rounds.
Azlan “We started shifting emphasis years ago and to be expected such things take time. ”
“As older gen officers (those who made there careers during the Emergency when the army was a lightly equipped organisation geared for internal security) retire; they will be replaced (already happening) by a younger generation of officers who from Day One will view things differently and will have a better understanding of what is needed; in equipment, mindset, doctrine and organisation. ”
Granted, but if one puts the “start” date for the transition about 30 years ago, then progress would appear to be painfully slow. Let’s talk a little about the kinds of personnel changes we would have seen over that time frame (which is longer than a career military man’s entire tenure of service.)
During such time, any given position in the service would have changed hands several times as people are promoted and retired. Since we’re concerned with officers, they would each have received successive iterations of professional military education. Doctrine would have been updated to reflect the changes. Training events, which officers new and old would have attended at several echelons, would have been redesigned. Exercises would have shown the shortfalls in organisation and equipment. Why have these not produced the desired results?
We would also have seen senior officers appointed who are interested in the right things (and were chosen for that reason), and they would have advocated the appointment of like-minded officers to other posts. You cited the phenomenon of career-minded officers being wary of saying the wrong things. On the flip side, has competition between officers ever positively advanced the army’s transition- such as officers competing to demonstrate enthusiasm for the boss’s new priorities? Do things indeed work like this in our army, or do we compete in “other directions”?
Another question I have is, if we have a “very long internal security tradition” and are still under its influence today, then what sort of internal security training do our units receive nowadays, or do we no longer do these things and is all our training oriented towards maneuver operations against a state-type adversary (even if it is not at the intensity required for conventional operations)?
@ AM
” what sort of internal security training do our units receive nowadays ”
Most of our infantry battalions, even those mechanized ones, regularly practice anti-riot and crowd control drills.
http://scontent.fkul16-1.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-9/fr/cp0/e15/q65/61424047_2699507670078131_8012329986826436608_n.jpg?_nc_cat=100&_nc_ht=scontent.fkul16-1.fna&oh=983521212449be7f91f38ff6405d53fc&oe=5D8EE42B
http://scontent.fkul16-1.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-9/fr/cp0/e15/q65/52071458_2522958014399765_1109485886162075648_n.jpg?_nc_cat=101&_nc_ht=scontent.fkul16-1.fna&oh=c2f72523bda9a50293e85a2652923a79&oe=5D89D8D4
AM,
Depends on the unit. The armoured and mechanised ones focus more on manoeuvre type combined arms ops whilst the others do stuff more geared towards internal security, i.e. patrols along the Thai border, manning outposts along the Kalimantan border, etc.
In an ideal world the army would be able to devote its focus and resources towards one major area : external security. The reality of course is that it can’t. External security or non state threats is still a concern and events that took place in 2913 which lead to the formation of ESSCOM has drawn away a lot of focus and resources.
At the end of the day the army is like the Thai and Indonesian one. A portion of the army being equipped and trained for external security with the balance still largely consisting of motorised units, less heavily armed and not as well equipped.
With regards to “competition”. The army is a large bureaucratic organisation. Competition is stiff amongst career officers and not only does an officer have to follow the right career path to get anyway but he also has to please right people. Unfortunately like any other army; the most capable people are not ones who may get selected for the right job or position.
The army is also reflective of our society as a whole with all its plus and negative aspects. How well it’s able to perform as a learning organisation and to change with the times to cope with new challenges and to do things better; can be hampered by parochialism, cultural issues, the level of education, etc.