SHAH ALAM: Back into the future. RMN has published its procurement priorities – some might call it wish list – for RMK12. The procurement plan was announced by RMN chief Admiral Reza Sany during his speech – made via the service’s social media channel – for the 86th anniversary of the navy on April 27.
Among the equipment being sought are eight LMS, two MRSS, two anti submarine helicopters, five maritime operations helicopters, eight special forces assault boats and 12 fast interceptor boats. Also in the plan are one unmanned aircraft system, one each mine hunting and mine disposal systems, a bridge simulator, a fast action tactical trainers and upgrades to the 14 fast attack crafts (FACs).
The upgrades of the FACs will see them with new power packs (engines and generators – not sure whether all brand new or refurbished) and fitted with new mini combat management system (CMS) for better surveillance and fire control – will allow the boats to operate for another 15 years.
Adm. Reza said most of the equipment like the LMS, assault boats, FIC and maritime operations helicopters are the follow on batch of things already procured under RMK11. RMN has taken delivery of the first LMS, KD Keris, in January while the rest are in various stages of the procurement processes. As for the second LMS, Admiral Reza said the ship had been completed and it was expected to be delivered and commissioned at any time soon.
The delivery and commissioning of Sundang was supposed to take place this month but it is delayed likely due to the coronavirus outbreak. The RMN chief also said that two more LMS will be delivered on scheduled in May and August, next year.
In his speech, Admiral Reza also said that the Navy was also proceeding with the 15 to 5 transformation plan though it has now been modified – though he did not explained the modifications. That’s for another day of course.
Anyhow the procurement plan looked very much what was said earlier including the ones that was detailed in the 2019 Defence White Paper with the exception of the two anti submarine helicopters. In the White Paper only the maritime operations helicopters were mentioned.
Of course, the elephant in the room is whether or not the government can afford all of the items above. It is also unclear whether the list had been approved for the RMK12 and more importantly funded. Of course the navy has the right to work towards getting what it feels was needed for it to perform it was tasked for, despite any funding difficulties faced by the government.
— Malaysian Defence
No additional submarines? No plans to add more teeth to the NGPVs?
So basically we are going to retain all the Perdana, Handalan and Jerong class FACs up till around 2040, with some of them will pass 60 years of service by then. Powerpack replacements would usually be with new engines.
So there would be batch 2 of the current LMS design. That would bring the LMS fleet to 12 units. I would hope that the 2nd batch would cost 1/2 of what the 1st batch is. Around USD 30 million would be about right for the cost of such ships (which actually could get MMEA a larsen and toubro OPV)
2 ASW helicopter? That is good news in my book. IMO if we are going to have 5 maritime operations helicopters, i am for getting additional 2 used Lynx airframes. That would be fitted with new transmissions, rotors and engine similar to our super lynx. With 8 lynx, 4 to be modified into ASW helicopters.
As for the MRSS, i am now inclined to go the radical path and get a modified fast RORO for this task. We actually need a fast logistical bridge from west to east malaysia more than actually need an amphibious landing capable ship. This could be had for around USD100-150 million each.
http://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/A-closer-look-at-the-Littoral-Strike-Ship-1014×487.jpg
http://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Prevail-Partners-Multi-Role-Vessel-1.jpg
http://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Prevail-Partners-Multi-Role-Vessel-stern-ramp.jpg
Then we should look into expanding our Auxillary force. Replacements for BM5 and BM6 should be sought, with replenishment capabilities. OSVs can be used as paskal staging base, submarine support, and salvage support.
@ ASM
A 3rd sub could be paid for in RMK13 2026-2030, but could start around 2023 or whereabouts
IMO TLDM should pass the NGPVs to MMEA by around 2030, when TLDM has all its Gowinds plus probably with batch 2 of the Gowinds..
@ASM
“No additional submarines? No plans to add more teeth to the NGPVs?”
Given the current state of LCS programme with not a single ship being completed yet, there is likely no chance we are getting anymore submarines or additional LCS/NGPV. if RMN wanted or can add Exocet and RIM missiles to NGPV they would already done it sooner.
I would like to agree with the previous opinions of the regular commenters that no further Kedahs/NGPVs orders should be made, instead use the funds of the extra 12 Kedahs for 6 more LCS in anti air/general purpose configuration for total 18 LCS or for 12 more LMS and 12 helicopters.
The Kedahs should be handed over to APNM circa RMK13/14 thus reducing RMN to only 4 classes of ships
1. Lets first see what the budget will be pared down to in coming years, due to recession and lower than projected oil revenue. Our neighbour Thailand has slashed its defence budget, with the army taking more than half of the cut.
2. With those numbers, it’s safe to assume the helicopters are intended to supplement rather than replace the existing RMN helicopter fleet.
3. “Among the equipment being sought are eight LMS,” Shows how desperate we are for hulls. We have barely operated the first LMS, let alone validated it in any of its intended roles.
ASM “No additional submarines? No plans to add more teeth to the NGPVs?”
Dream on.
“The Kedahs should be handed over to APNM circa RMK13/14 thus reducing RMN to only 4 classes of ships”
The RMN urgently needs more hulls and is stretched as it is. The Kedahs specifically have navy roles in peace and war. The RMN won’t be able to hand them over even if the Kedahs are replaced hull for hull.
Btw what became of the move to reactivate the Laksamanas?
Reply
Still on going, it’s difficult to get updates
@ AM
” The RMN urgently needs more hulls and is stretched as it is. The Kedahs specifically have navy roles in peace and war. The RMN won’t be able to hand them over even if the Kedahs are replaced hull for hull ”
Malaysia in general needs more hulls for maritime security, not TLDM specifically. The kedahs will still be there, defending and patrolling our waters. Just it would operating under MMEA. TLDM does not need to replace the Kedah hull for hull, and in war situation the kedahs would be easy targets (ie it can barely defend itself, so IMO the kedahs should not be in a war situation in the 1st place). An OPV is better operated painted with white hulls. Would be seen as less escalatory and would be the correct response to chinese coast guard ships, fishing vessels and survey ships encroaching our EEZ.
Going for more LMS would also mean that we would probably need another platform to host our future minehunting and mine disposal systems. The LMS can be used, but space is limited on that ship.
Why i propose for TLDM to expand its auxillary force. Offshore Support Vessels (OSV) would be ideal platform to host minehunting and mine disposal systems. Plenty of used ships can be had cheaply, now more so with the oil price crash. Probably 3-4 of the same type would be ideal.
http://img.offshore-mag.com/files/base/ebm/os/image/2020/03/2003OFFvess_p01.5e7a50cd5a016.png
Can TLDM get Damen 1800 for another 8 LMS hull. IMO it would serve more purpose rather than current LMS.
The NGPV cannot be given up. As it is all the boats m ships have been intensively used n we need to get them off work for maintenance n upgrading. The bigger NGPVs play an important role in ocean patrolling as the fast strike craft does not have the sea keeping quality for open ocean. These strike crafts n the NGPV complement each other
When the situation gets better, we need GST back.
Strange. We gonna have 6 LCS but only projected need of 2 AS choppers? I’d prefer 1 chopper based on each LCS so the AS fleet won’t be over stretched.
I dont wanna sound sceptical here but until this covid 19 is totally over, we cant spend that much on defence but totally agree that we need to strengthen our naval/maritime power now that ccg currently messing in our waters..and yes we seriously need to invest to fit the kedahs with more punch..rws at least..so total 5 maritime helicopters or 8 as i understand that 3 of them already approved in rmk 11 or only another 2 followup in rmk12?..5 or 8,it will surely increase rmn capability in transportation..2 asw heli i guess for the two early lcs, lcs1 n lcs2..that good..but i still believe we need corvette in our arsenal..mybe 4 or 6 using ngpv batch 2 design and then pass the old kedahs to mmea..the lekius is still good for another 10 years at least with latest upgrade integrating vibrant 01 cms, just need to replace the seawolf missiles
I concur, the kota bahru class OPV is more politically acceptable and much cheaper to buy compared to the lms in the current scenario where the chinese navy being very active in scs. It would be awkward to send the lms on constabulary patrol in scs and facing the chinese ships?
@ Lee Yoke Meng
Nobody here is suggesting that the NGPV is to be given up. A few including me suggests that the NGPV should be painted white and operated under MMEA, not TLDM.
Why? We need to use Chinas tactic against itself. Our main response to chinas coast guard, fishing militia and survey ships should be white hulled ships from MMEA. Read these articles and come back to add into the discussion.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-seas-‘white-hull’-warfare-15604
http://warontherocks.com/2018/02/white-hull-approach-taming-dragon-using-coast-guard-counter-china/
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-‘white-hull’-challenge-the-south-china-sea-14890
Quite a long list and pretty much unaffordable if you look at govt finance and commitment for the past decades.
Suggest that we try to focus our effort and optimize on what we already have;
1. Complete LCS x6 – need add. funds
2. Upgrade the FAC x14 – power packs and new gun-missiles mount like SMASH Aselsan.
3. Upgrade the NGPV x6 – equip with missiles Exocet Mk3/ LSM ASM and Anti-air like RAM and ASW Torpedos.
4. Maritime Utility/ ASW Helicopters x6 – Surplus Blackhawks or Lynxs
5. MRSS x2 – Korea or Indonesia design
If can, i would like to push it for a Marine Brigade based in Bintulu but can’t see how we can afford them in the next 10years.
@ hazwan 88
1. Complete LCS x6 – need add. funds
Just need the budget for 2 more, as most has been paid for in RMK11
2. Upgrade the FAC x14 – power packs and new gun-missiles mount like SMASH Aselsan.
I believe 2-3 already repowered. So about 11 more to go. Change the rear guns to SMASH or even chinese CS/AN3 if got additional budget.
3. Upgrade the NGPV x6 – equip with missiles Exocet Mk3/ LSM ASM and Anti-air like RAM and ASW Torpedos.
No need. Leave the NGPV as is.
4. Maritime Utility/ ASW Helicopters x6 – Surplus Blackhawks or Lynxs
Both are different helicopters
5. MRSS x2 – Korea or Indonesia design
See my previous comments.
Just equip the forces in east malaysia adequately and we should be fine without a marine brigade. Australia can do without it, so can we.
@ marhalim
Firdaus has risen a good question. Is the 5 maritime operations helicopters additional to the 3 already approved?
If that is the case, yes there would be 8 maritime operations helicopters overall. Would be perfect if we can get used EC225LP for this too, but supplies are quickly drying up.
On the question of additional OPVs for MMEA and if we can afford it?
IMO we can afford additional OPVs for MMEA. Yes even if the annual development expenditure (DE) is maintained at around RM410-460 million per year throughout the RMK12 and RMK13. For 2019 the MMEA DE was RM469 milion, while for 2020 the DE is RM414 million. Say its RM440 million, that is already RM4.4 billion for 10 years, around USD1 billion.
Pure OPVs does not cost much. The current MMEA Damen OPV1800 costs USD56 milion each.
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/OPV-18002-1024×465.jpg
The Larsen and Toubro Vikram class OPV just cost USD32 million each (IMO one of a few good things we can get from India). The vessels are approximately 97 meters long, displace 2,140 tons and have a range of 5,000 nautical miles. They can attain a sustained speed of up to 26 knots. It is equipped with a helicopter hangar and sailed with a crew of 102 persons.
http://www.iastoppers.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/OPV-Vikram-iastoppers.jpg
Our neighbours indonesian coast guard BAKAMLA 80m OPVs made in Batam costs just USD16 million each!
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-VVrTlj078Vg/XamuvHvQHEI/AAAAAAABILA/SGMZ5BV3LRoXzEOaewruWUvoK5jTOV1rQCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/Bakamla%2BKN321-3.jpg
To take that into perspective, the smaller TLDM LMS68 costs USD60 million each. Those OPVs are of the same size of the Kedah Class OPVs of TLDM. So let MMEA buy those OPVs, clearing TLDM budget to be able to rearrange the additional gowind and submarine build schedules forward (to RMK 13 2026-2030)
Back to MMEA. We have paid for 3 DAMEN OPVs in RMK11. Up to 2030 IMO we should get a batch 2 of the damen OPV, then 6 of the Larsen and Toubro Vikram class OPV. That would be additional 9 OPVs into the MMEA fleet. The total cost of these ships would come to USD304 million. So we can actually get 9 OPVs for around the cost of 1 NGPV. So that answers the question if MMEA can afford additional OPVs.
So by 2030 Malaysia could have
6 DAMEN OPV
6 Larsen and Toubro OPV
6 NGPV
6-9 Gowind
2 Lekiu F2000
Why i prefer all OPVs to MMEA? In serious conflict situations, an OPV, even armed with SAM and ASM has very small chance of surviving. OPVs will sit out of a serious conflict to save them from being destroyed. Want well armed ships? Get proper frigates like gowinds instead.
There will be a need for both OPVs and Frigates. But there should be a clear difference in capabilities and use of both, and we need to make sure not to over spec the OPV to do something it cannot.
In malaysia’s situation, a fleet of around 20 OPVs (with MMEA) and 12 Frigates (with TLDM) will give our seas and EEZ at sea deployment of around 10 OPVs and Frigates at all times. We need to consolidate both MMEA Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040 (PPSMM 2040) and TLDM 15 to 5 plan as a comprehensive malaysian maritime defence strategy.
In the long run anything is possible. But for the immediate requirements, our ships are all aged except for the just delivered LMS n the to be completed second LMS. The 3rd n 4th ships would take two to three more years to reach us.
Meanwhile we need to take ships n boats out foe their regular scheduled maintenance n repairs. So any ships taken out of commission would require other ships to replace them. Otherwise there would be gaps.
Thats why the RMN cannot give up the NGPV to the MMEA. We would need all RMN ships to be in full operations otherwise these ships would not be able to perform at their tip top condition. We have gone through this situation before in the 70 n 80’s where the RMN flog their ships to death just to put sufficient ships to form a barrier to the Vietnamese refugees. Ships have been operating on one engine out of 4 n 1 generator out of 2. RMN needs to numbers to rotate the ships through maintenance n repairs to ensure that these ships can perform their function.
We must learnt the lessons from the past n not repeat our mistakes.
Secondly, the RMN needs large ships with good sea keeping qualities to patrol the open ocean. Our strike crafts are not suitable for such functions. Let me just go back to history again n how many still remember how one of the fast patrol boats sank during heavy seas?. Many other patrol crafts had bad experience before where they met with heavy seas n need to turn back but loosing all equipment on deck even when they are securely fastened to deck. A bigger ship like the NGPV will be better able to handle such rough seas. Of course, in the ling run transfer the NGPV to the mmea if such big ships can be replaced by new replacement cimbatants. But until this gappens tge RMN cannot do away with them
@….
If we want to challenge CCG using NGPVs under our MMEA, I think it should be more heavily armed to intimidate them a bit. Additional guns, maybe mortars, a basic SAM (like stinger) should do the trick. Plus more armour if ramming is needed.
Actually I don’t really understand why TLDM went for LMS while the NGPVs are already available. A MMEA variant could be derived from the NGPV, with emphasis on more armour and close in weaponry, while the Navy would have better sensors and offensive weaponry.
I’m more concerned about what kind of ASuW helo the navy is planning. Our LCS deck is configured to be able to accept EC725/H225M so prolly that helo
“In serious conflict situations, an OPV, even armed with SAM and ASM has very small chance of surviving.”
Certainly. But simply for lack of other assets, the RMN will have to take its chances and expose them to threats that they are not equipped to deal with. For example, in surveillance of parts of our very long coastline where we would otherwise totally lack domain awareness, or as pickets for other naval units. Being in a state of war also not mean that hostilities will break out in all parts of the country, but these places have to be patrolled in case they do.
There are also contingencies that are short of war in which a naval unit is needed but a higher tech vessel is unnecessary.
Of course, it can’t be denied that the MMEA is woefully short of OPVs and should be the MMEA that is tasked with the day to day operations in our EEZ.
@ Lee Yoke Meng
You are talking as if MMEA is not a malaysian entity. Even if the NGPVs is under MMEA, it will still patrol the open oceans to take what you describe it, for malaysian interests. No reduction in malaysian overall large ship patrol capability. It is just not sailed under TLDM.
@ ASM
Heavily arming them would defeat the very reason for a white-painted coast guard ship.
@ AM
patrolling is a policing, constabulary task, a main task of a coast guard, but a secondary one for a navy. As we already have a coast guard, OPVs should be operated by them. Anything short of a war, tasks should be done by MMEA, not a naval unit equipped with patrol-only capable ships. If MMEA is short of OPVs, that is a reason for the NGPVs to be transferred to them.
….
Anyway, I have written above that MMEA just needs its current level of budgets to be maintained to 2030 to get 9 more OPVs. Even that the OPVs would consume just 30% of the MMEA budget. It can be done. And it will free TUDM from having to waste its budget on low performance patrol ships.
This is important for me as budget freed could be used to expedite the build of 3 more Gowinds and 1 more Scorpenes before 2030 (within the RMK13 budget). A TLDM with 9 Gowinds, 3 Scorpenes and 2 Lekius is much more capable as a fighting force than saddled with more of the expensive but barely armed NGPVs. We dont have the luxury anymore to waste millions to build expensive OPVs like the NGPV when it can be done by a dedicated coast guard OPV at 10% of the cost.
My goal for TUDM and MMEA to 2030
– MMEA to be equipped with up to 20 OPVs to better able to confront and escort all chinese coast guard, fishing militia and survey ships in our EEZ. Chinese coast guard should be correctly countered with MMEA.
– TLDM to enhance its warfighting and deterrance capability compared to 2020. A fleet of 11 fully armed frigates (9 Gowinds and 2 Lekius) and 3 Scorpenes is a substantial increase in capability. Lekiu replacement and more Scorpenes to be added 2031-2040.
Cost of additional 3 Gowinds and 1 Scorpene? About USD1.8 to 1.9 billion. Compare this to the original 15 to 5 RMK13 plan :
RMK13 2026-2030
5x NGPV Kedah (usd1.5 billion)
7x LMS (usd0.42 billion)
2x MRSS (0.3 billion)
Anyway lets go back to the original 15 to 5 RMK12 plan:
RMK12 2021-2025
3x SGPV Gowind (usd1.4 billion)
8x LMS (usd0.48 billion)
1x NGPV Kedah (usd0.3 billion)
1x MRSS (usd0.15 billion)
The updated plan should look like this:
RMK12 2021-2025
2x SGPV Gowind (usd0.9 billion) – why? because we have paid for 4 ships in RMK11.
8x LMS (usd0.48 billion) – which if deleted, can fund more OPVs for MMEA. Is it possible for the cost to be halved per ship compared to the 1st batch?
2x MRSS (usd0.3 billion)
2x ASW helicopters (usd0.1 billion – price of philippines 2 wildcats, that cost actually could convert all 6 of our current Lynx to ASW, or additional 2 used airframe and convert 4 to ASW)
5x MOH helicopters (usd0.15) if buy new
12x FIC (usd0.05 billion)
…. – “ Just it would operating under MMEA””
That’s assuming the MMEA is able to raise the manpower needed to operate and maintain the Kedahs and if its operating budget is increased to pay for the upkeep.
…, – “Actually I don’t really understand why TLDM went for LMS while the NGPVs are already available”
Something smaller and cheaper operate plays a major part on the calculation.
AM /“There are also contingencies that are short of war in which a naval unit is needed but a higher tech vessel is unnecessary”
Indeed. One can’t cater for every contingency. Our planning is catered in the expectation that id a state on state conflict breaks out; it will be a short one before politics or diplomacy enters the picture.
Alex – “Our LCS deck is configured to be able to accept EC725/H225M”
If it had its way, Romeos. The alternative is the Wildcat which is unsuitable for ASW which is time consuming and might require a helo to fly zine distance. Not only range is an issue with it but it’s endurance and carrying capacity. It can’t carry dipping sonar and a pair of torps and sonobuoys. The alternative would be one carrying torps and one carrying a sonar – not the ideal way of doing things from a operational perspective.
– Will be interesting to see how things pan out in the coming years with the ASW helo requirement and how successful the RMN is in getting a ASW platform other than a Wildcat with it’s inherent range, endurance and limitations which are so essential for ASW.
– It’s a sign of how desperate the RMN is when it’s forced to actually consider further upgrades to the aged and increasingly maintenance intensive FAC fleet. The previous intention was just to spend the bare minimum on them to keep them operational.
“a fast action tactical trainers”..please someone clarify, I dunno what is it.
I am so excited & full of optimistic when reading Mr …. list of suggestions for our MMEA & TLDM.
How hopeful I am that somebody up there pick up his detailed suggestions & turn into reality, or make it better one.
The current issues we have now have been there for many years, but I am still optimistic that we still have the chance of better future in improving our national defence & security (although my pessimistic grows even more, looking at things happened for past 10-20 years).
Have to agree with some point that have been highlighted by … and Azlan.
In RMK13 (2026-2030) TLDM could have procure 3 more Gowind and 1 Scorpene
– 9 Gowind
– 2 Lekiu
– 6 Kedah
– 12 LMS
– 3 Scorpene
– 2 MRSS
I would suggest that instead of additional Scorpene, TLDM should complete the order of the 2 of 5 classes. Not ordering a submarine would enable TLDM to buy 1 more MRSS (usd150m x1) , 6 more LMS (usd50m x6) and additional helicopters (usd50-100m). This will free the budget in RMK14 and RMK15 for remaining Gowind and Scorpene only. The planed budget for additional 12 Kedah should be use to build 4-5 more Gowind.
So by 2030 TLDM will have:
– 9 Gowind
– 2 Lekiu
– 6 Kedah
– 18 LMS (completed)
– 2 Scorpene
– 3 MRSS (completed)
All suggestions here are ‘masuk akal’ if we can do it the right way from the get go..Thats lie the problem with our ‘bidang pertahanan’ with murky dealing, repeated mistakes, crony taking too much profit..Sorry that i pointed out loud but that just the grave reality with our defence/mmea procurement program.For comparison, struggling Filifinos already got their brp gabriella silang opv, already got wildcat heli, their frigate albeit basic brp jose rizal already on sea trials, the second, antonio luna already in production..When the time for our first lcs enter service, the pinoy will operate 2 brand new frigate already..
As for transferring ngpv to mmea..yeah partially agree with this but like i mention before, from my pov, we still need, smaller corvette with sufficient armament in our arsenal, 4,6 or max 8..and then transfer the old ngpvs to mmea.
No comment on asw helos though, as for maritime utility helos, we will see what model will rmn/govt choose for the first three that already approved and follow from there..With RM220 juta that already approved for the first 3..We cant choose the premium helos straight away.
@ azlan
on the romeos
Yeah everyone wants a Vellfire. But it is no use to plan for a vellfire when your budget can only buy you a Sienta.
@ luqman
Thanks for your suggestions. It is a good thing to discuss what we can do for the future instead of what we cannot do.
As for additional 6 LMS by 2030. Why i think it is not required? Because of the plan to repower all the 14 FACs. With this repowering plan, our FACs would be in service up to 2035-2040. So we would still have 14 FACs in addition to 12 LMS in 2030.
MRSS. We can improve the capability of our army units actually on the ground in sabah and sarawak. We could also implement pre-positioned stocks of equipments. This would lessen the need for a 3rd MRSS. We could also add a few RORO/ROLO ships into our auxillary fleet, used ships on the market costs around usd10 million.
http://www.workboatsinternational.com/images3/rolo-heavy-lift-cargo-ship-3441.jpg
In RMK14 and 15, i would plan for more Scorpenes (3 more) and 4 Type 31 frigates to replace the lekiu and kasturi 1 to 1 (i forgot about the kasturis in my posts above). So TLDM 2040
– 6 Scorpenes
– 4 Type 31 frigates
– 9 Gowinds
– 12 LMS
– 2 MRSS
– (kedah class to MMEA)
http://www.savetheroyalnavy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Arrowhead-140-Type-31e-frigate-candidate-1014×487.jpg
What is important right now, our main priority is not to have our seas colonized or “dijajah” by a powerful neo-colonizers. Now they cannot colonize our lands, they are trying to colonize our seas. One additional Scorpene by 2030, although sounds little, is a powerful deterrant or “menakutkan” for any wannabe agressors, more than additional 6 LMS (that remember is made in china) or MRSS. We must not lose our seas, our oil and gas, our fishing rights to neo-colonizers and agressors.
@Firdaus
Hats off to the Philippine for their 12 FA-50 jets, 2 new Makassar variant LPD and 2 new Jose Rizal frigate (though their specs and size seems like a corvette to me) If we want to arm the Kedahs NGPV with missiles then they should be kept in TLDM post 2030. The cost for 21 RIM-116 RAM Block2 missiles is around usd21m. For six ships that is around usd126m excluding their launchers. Then again the Kedah RAM missile could be retrofitted on the Gowind later on.
@…
6 Scorpene subs is more than what RMN wanted. But this is achievable if RMN agreed to omit the extra 12 Kedah NGPV and some Gowind/LMS hulls.
On type 31 frigates, I sincerely had hoped for RMN to choose a smaller Iver huitfeldt design. If anyone said that its too big then we should not bother to build and maintain the larger MRSS class. The cost is much less and can carry more weapons and larger radars with twice detection range of Gowind radar.
RMK12
– 2 Gowind LCS (usd0.9b) for the remaining ships not funded for original 6 ships
– 2 MRSS (usd0.3b)
– 8 LMS (usd0.4b)
– 3 Damen OPV for MMEA (usd0.17b)
RMK13
– 3 Gowind LCS (usd1b)
– 1 Scorpene (usd0.5b)
– 3 Damen OPV for MMEA (usd0.17b)
RMK14
– 3 Type31 air defence (usd1b)
– 1 Scorpene (usd0.5b)
RMK15
– 2 Gowind LCS (usd0.65b)
– 1 Scorpene (usd0.5b)
– 8 improved LMS to replace FAC (usd0.4)
We can assume that the follow on Gowind orders is cheaper than 1st batch. I think this plan of roughly usd1.5b per RMK for TLDM is feasible and realistic. Any other suggestions?
“the lekius is still good for another 10 years at least with latest upgrade integrating vibrant 01 cms, just need to replace the seawolf missiles”
Does anybody know if the Vibrant 01 CMS for Lekiu is integrated with the Lekiu’s weapon systems? Is it working with Exocet, etc? Seems to have gone all quiet after the announcements last year.
Reply
It was Jebat that was fitted with new CMS
…. – “Yeah everyone wants a Vellfire. But it is no use to plan for a vellfire when your budget can only buy you a Sienta.””
If we’re going to talk about what we can’t afford at present then we can’t talk about most things can’t we? An ASW helo purchase is not imminent and the state of finances could change.
Your Hellfiire/Sienta analogy is simply not apt. With regards to ASW helos the comparison is one with had very decent range, endurance, lift capacity (all needed for the time
consuming business that is ASW) and one that simply doesn’t and is why the majority of users haven’t bothered to configure theirs. It’s a question about operational effectiveness – full stop/period.
@ luqman
Iver huidtfelt = type 31. Just some difference in fitout.
Why type 31 after 9 Gowinds? My reasoning is that we need a larger general purpose frigate that can act as a flagship for a task force, able to carry more bording RHIBs and teams than a gowind, and a large hangar to store both a UAV and helicopter.
FYI the current development expenditure for TLDM is around USD2 billion per 5 year RMK. MMEA budget is separate from TLDM so it should not be put together.
My plan which i wrote 2 years ago is as the link below. Other than the LMS which would be unworkable, others is IMO still a good plan to be executed.
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/another-look-rmn-15-to-5/
This is my plan for MMEA
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/apmm-plans/
““In serious conflict situations, an OPV, even armed with SAM and ASM has very small chance of surviving.”
Depends on what that “serious conflict” is – relative. In a “serious conflict” even an LCS or for that matter a Ticonderoga might not survive. In a low threat conflict an OPV could also end up sunk – relative.
The trick is to ensure that the OPV is not misused or placed in a position where it’s modest capabilities are put to test. Just like how one would never place an armed Cougar or a S-70 in a situation which clearly calls for a Apache or a Tiger.
Our threat perceptions don’t see us being placed in a high threat situation; the whole of the MAF reflects this.
@ azlan
” If we’re going to talk about what we can’t afford at present then we can’t talk about most things can’t we? An ASW helo purchase is not imminent and the state of finances could change ”
Okay lets talk about the Romeo. The ASW helo purchase is to be done in RMK12 2021-2025 as Marhalim has written here. Hopefully that the state of finances (even with the Covid19 crisis we are going through now) could change in 5 years time for TLDM to really afford the Romeo.
The cheapest Romeo package to date is for 7 helicopters for Greece for USD600 million
http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/greece-mh-60r-multi-mission-helicopters
Or you can go the EDA route with SH-60F. Israel is getiing 8 fully mission capable for USD300 million, Tunisia on the other hand is getting 12 but only functions as SAR and utility helicopter for USD282 million.
http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/tunisia-refurbishment-twelve-sh-60f-multi-mission-helicopters
http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/israel-excess-sh-60f-sea-hawk-helicopter-equipment-and-support
We are too late to get aussie retired seahawks. All now sold to civilian firefighting companies.
@ azlan
” Our threat perceptions don’t see us being placed in a high threat situation; the whole of the MAF reflects this ”
Still this is not a valid operational and political reason on why all OPVs should not be painted white and operated exclusively by MMEA.
@…
The current Type31 frigate budget would not be fitted with anti-ship missiles. Re-equip them with Thales N200 (400km range), NSM anti-ship missile and what ever surface to air missiles TLDM will get for Gowind (VL-MICA, CAMM-ER, ESSM) may increase the price to around usd0.35b. In all, its a redundant to get two different hulls with the major differences are not having towed array sonar, more boats and a larger radar. Instead, get a full fledged Iver Huidtfelt for usd0.36b (Indonesian price) with Thales NS200 radar (replace both SMART-L and APAR radar), with full capability of SM2, ESSM and 16xNSM.
Adjusting the cost for usd2b for each RMK would be:
RMK12
– 2 Gowind LCS (usd0.9b) for the remaining ships not funded for original 6 ships
– 2 MRSS (usd0.3b)
– 8 LMS (usd0.4b)
– Helicopters and FAC upgrades (usd0.4b)
RMK13
– 3 Gowind LCS (usd1b) lower price than 1st batch due to ToT etc.
– 2 Scorpene (usd1b)
RMK14
– 3 Type31 with NS200 radar, SM2s, ESSM & NSM (usd1.1b)
– 2 Scorpene (usd1b)
RMK15
– 3 Gowind LCS (usd1b)
– 1 Type31 (usd0.36b)
– 1 MRSS (usd0.15b)
– ASW & marine helicopters (usd0.5b)
By 2040 TLDM will have
– 12 Gowind (mixed ASW&GP)
– 4 Type31 (GP/Air Defence)
– 6 Scorpene subs
– 12 LMS
– 14 FAC
– 3 MRSS
by this time
– Lekius & Kasturis have been retired
– FACs should be slowly replaced by LMS in next RMK
– Kedah have been handed over to MMEA
This would make TLDM a very potent navy in the area. Anymore opinion
IMHO the RMN needs 1 submarine recovery submarine and 10 littoral submarines.
What models would you gents want?
I’m not a fan of Scorpene.. The German U-boats seem more promising.
@ Luqman
Redundant means both can do the same things. IMO if you need to go subhunting, just deploy the Gowinds instead. The Type 31 if bought does not need to be equipped to do what the Gowinds can do. The Type 31 and Iver Huitfeldt cost is low as the weapons are paid separately and Ivers case, salvaged from older ships. For our Type 31 even for basic specs, it would cost us at least USD375 million, with guns salvaged from Laksamana corvettes and hopefully if we can buy a few pohang corvettes for MMEA, guns salvaged from that ship too. My spec for the ships:
NS200 radar
1x 76mm super rapid
2x 40mm DARDO
8x NSM
32x CAMM
4x RHIB boats or 2x RHIB plus 2x USV
1x UAV
1x helicopter
As for getting more gowinds for just USD333 million. I dont think it can be done. At best USD400 million each. For the Gowinds, as the air defence missiles is still not yet decided, I would prefer if it could be CAMM instead of VL-MICA.
Also no FACs will be around in 2040. it would be slowly phased out from 2035-2040 as they will be more than 60 years old by then.
My alternative plan for now
alternative RMK12 2020-2025
2x SGPV Gowind USD1000 mil (include additional cost due to delay)
2x MRSS USD300 mil
16x FIC USD50 mil
5x AS332 USD50 mil (used – maritime utility helicopter)
4x Lynx ASW upgrades USD100 mil (2 additional used + 2 conversion from existing)
2x AS355NP USD5 mil (used – utility and PASKAL support)
8x LMS68 USD250 mil
1x Autonomous MCM system USD60 mil
3x Offshore OSV USD40 mil (used – MCM, survey, salvage, PASKAL support, as auxillary ship)
2x Support tanker USD60 mil (Brand new Indonesia 150m tanker BM5 BM6 replacement, as auxillary ship)
alternative RMK13 2026-2030
3x SGPV Gowind USD1200 mil Gowind no.7, 8 & 9
1x Scorpene USD500 mil Scorpene no.3
3x Autonomous MCM system USD180 mil
16x FIC USD50 mil
2x Floating base USD30 mil (used – tanker ship conversion semisubmersible, as auxillary ship)
1x Heavilift RORO USD10 mil (used – additional transport – as auxillary ship)
alternative RMK14 2030-2035
2x Arrowhead 140 USD750 mil (replacement of Kasturi class)
2x Scorpene NG USD1000 mil Scorpene no.4 and 5 (no 5 actually to be built in RMK15 due to the need to use the facility for 2nd refit of no. 1 and 2)
3x Minisub DG350 USD250 mil
alternative RMK15 2036-2040
2x Arrowhead 140 USD750 mil (replacement of Lekiu class)
1x Scorpene NG USD500 mil Scorpene no. 6
3x Minisub DG350 USD250 mil
8x ASW Helicopter USD600 mil
So TLDM 2040 fleet would be
4x Type 31
9x Gowind ASW
6x Scorpene
6x DG350
12x LMS
2x MRSS
With an auxillary fleet (Skuadron Kapal Bantuan) of
KA tun azizan
KA semisub floating base 1
KA semisub floating base 2
KA replenishment oiler 1
KA replenishment oiler 2
MV Mega Bakti
MV Heavylift RORO
KA offshore OSV 1
KA offshore OSV 2
KA offshore OSV 3
Why is the minisub?
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6WGT9dQWjPI/XdT5XLQbInI/AAAAAAAAAnA/TmnJ7PJhlfsVqsw2QxZ31sgKIbz_d5rZgCEwYBhgL/s1600/Defense%2B%2526%2BSecurity%2BThailand%2B2019%2BDRASS%2Bto%2Bsecure%2Bits%2Bplace%2Bon%2Bsubmarine%2Bmarket.JPG
Basically the minisub would be the replacement of the littoral strike capability that is done previously by the FACs, as an asymmetric response to much larger and stronger aggressors. An aggressor sailing in our waters or trying to do amphibious landings would need massive amount of resources to find and neutralize our underwater strike elements. This would slow down their movement and creates massive amounts of uncertainty to their planning. So peacetime taskings to MMEA, War/deterrence would be by TLDM.
Anyway below a great read on the Iver Huitfeldt, the basis of the Type 31 frigate.
https://2018.f.a0z.ru/06/16-6377877-105.png
To read the whole article above. Replace the last 3 digits of the Url
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Reply
The Maharaja Lela class will be fitted with MICA. BNS has already bought the launchers. It is the government which has not signed for the missiles.
@ marhalim
Still to be seen if the launchers are exclusively for VL MICA (actually VL MICA does not have to use any launcher, as the missile storage canister can act as a launcher), or sylver launchers that can also take CAMM. If it is the sylvers, it is still not too late to go for CAMM. Getting CAMM would give us misslie commonality with 2 of our FPDA allies, UK and New Zealand.
anyway if the link above is difficult to pass, use this link instead for the iver article
http://forums.airbase.ru/2018/01/t91978_10–vms-danii.html
….. – “Still this is not a valid operational and political reason on why all OPVs should not be painted white and operated exclusively by MMEA””
If you care to look at my previous postings I’ve constantly stressed that the RMN should eventually do away totally with the peacetime constabulary role ….
The discussion was also cantered on the fact that nothing is written in stone; depends wholly on the circumstances.
…. – “Basically the minisub would be the replacement of the littoral strike capability that is done previously by the FACs, as an asymmetric response to much larger and stronger aggressors””
A mini sub or any sub for that matter can’t replace a surface unit and it’s not intended to …. It’s just like saying that if we can’t afford sufficient fighters; we should rely instead on a ground based AD system when in fact fighters and ground based AD systems complement and can never replace one another ….
You’ve also overlooked the fact that it’s not the sub per see that makes the overall difference but for the sub is deployed and operated in conjunction with various assets.
Another major issue with mini subs – despite various improvements – is that they are still limited on range, endurance, sea keeping and the range of their onboard sensors …….
These are the classic reasons why most navies have not gone for them and why they are mainly used for special forces insertion or for other specific tasks of short durations ….
…. – “This would slow down their movement and creates massive amounts of uncertainty to their planning””
Sounds great on paper but an opponent would have factored in the possibility of us deploying various assets and if the opponent knew we had deployed mini subs; he would advantage of the limitations suffered by mini subs and plan around it. The opponent would probably also have ASW units in the area.
…. – “Okay lets talk about the Romeo”
My point is not about the Romeo per see but the clear and irrefutable fact that ASW is a time consuming business and the Wildcat simply doesn’t have the needed range, endurance or lift capacity for the the task.
Of course one could be faced with an operational scenario in which conditions are so perfect that a Wildcat only has to fly to a point a few minutes away and spend a few minutes over the area before releasing its single torp; a situation in which its limited range, endurance and lift capacity is not an issue – possible but highly unlikely ….
In a actual reality a sub or plane would have to spend considerable tint over the contact before establishing a good enough solution to release a torp – even then several torps and dozens of sonobuoys would probably have been expended.
…. – “ I would prefer if it could be CAMM instead of VL-MICA””
Not the actual missile that makes the difference (despite respective merits) but early warning and networking that will determine the chances of a ship withstanding an attack.
@Melayu Ketinggalan
Some of your question has been answered by @..
The German U-boats (Type 209 & 214 mainly) are certainly attractive since they are eqquiped with AIPs and cheaper (~usd350m compared to scorpene’s usd450-500m) and same number of torpedo tubes. There must have been a few reasons why TLDM did not opted for these U-boats in 15 to 5 plan ie training, logistical chain, other capabilities etc. By 2030 Indonesia would have 9 type 209 derivatives and Singapore with 4 type 218sg Archer class
@…
Thanks for the thorough plan as always even including auxillary ships. Though I still would prefer the Type31 to be configured with longer range surface to air missiles like CAMM-ER or ESSM block II. Let just see what are the price for the following batch of Gowinds. The cost should gone down much more like on Type31 with no towed array sonar.
Off topic
US Navy goes for FREMMs! 1st ship to cost USD795 million. A clear sign that the US navy LCS is not a substitute for a proper frigate.
http://news.usni.org/2020/04/30/fincantieri-wins-795m-contract-for-navy-frigate-program
Very very off topic
Pictures of norinco SH-15 155mm self propelled howitzers in PLA service. Now known by its local designation PCL-181. The SH-15 costs according to the Pakistan army contract, usd2.1 million each.
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/bmpd/38024980/7998157/7998157_original.jpg
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/dambiev/74651708/2891157/2891157_1000.jpg
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/dambiev/74651708/2893041/2893041_1000.jpg
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/dambiev/74651708/2893554/2893554_1000.jpg
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/dambiev/74651708/2893696/2893696_1000.jpg
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/dambiev/74651708/2893878/2893878_1000.jpg
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/dambiev/74651708/2894152/2894152_1000.jpg
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/dambiev/74651708/2894638/2894638_1000.jpg
@ azlan
” You’ve also overlooked the fact that it’s not the sub per see that makes the overall difference ”
Of course it needs to be deployed in consideration of all other assets. So do i need to add “to be deployed in consideration of all other assets” at every single idea of mine from now on so that you wont put that comment?
Actually it would be a great alternative to FACs to do what FACs is supposed to do, near shore, short range raiding and attacking larger enemy ships by surprise. The surprise element of speed by the FAC is now replaced by the unseen factor of minisubs. With current long range and hi-definition of radars and other sensors, it is difficult for FACs to strike by surprise anymore. Minisubs, lurking in shallow waters would be a surprise element to any enemy. Even if there is actually no subs in that area, the enemy cannot assume that it is not and need to deploy assets to search for the submarine that is actually not there. Our use of FACs to do constabulary duties would be taken up by MMEA PCs, with more ships like the NGPC.
As for range, by 2030 the battery tech, fueled by electric car progress, would trickle into submarines. Even current Li-Ion tech has a power density twice of the normal wet plate batteries.
http://www.udt-global.com/__media/libraries/sensors-and-processing/76—Anders-Wikstrom-Slides.pdf
This is the basic spec of the DG350, it is actually not so mini, about 25% the size of the scorpene.
DG-350 Specification
Displacememt: 291 tons surfaced, 352 tons submerged
Length: 34.8 m
Width: 3 m hull diameter, 3.5 m with hydroplanes
Height: 7.15 m
Crew: 9 + 12 PAX
Range: 2,500 nm, 200 nm on batteries
Speed: 12 kt max, 5 kt cruising, 9 kt surfaced
Operating depth: 150 m
Armament: 3 x 533mm torpedoes standard, plus 2 x lightweight torpedoes or 8 x mines in lateral tubes as mission-specific load
Other: 2 x 4-man SDVs or 2 x 8-man inflatable boats and up to 12 Special Forces containers
Equipment: Passive Sonar, Obstacle Distance Measurement System, SWR Intercept Sonar, Radar Warning Receiver, Electronic Support Measure (OPTIONAL), TV Periscope System (2nd Periscope Optional), HF Transceiver, UHF/VHF Transceiver, Underwater Communication System, Sound Powered Telephone, Intercom Network, Inertial Navigation System, Echo Sounder with Sound Velocity, Doppler Velocity Log
http://www.hisutton.com/images/Drass_DG350.jpg
http://www.hisutton.com/images/Drass_DG350_schematic.jpg
You can see that the DG-350 range is actually longer than even our LMS68, which has a range of only 2000nm. With future Li-Ion batteries, the submerged range could be 400nm. Compare to our scorpenes, with submerged range of 550nm. The addition of these 6 DG-350 to 6 Scorpenes would create a very capable and powerful subsurface fleet, that would enable our political and diplomatic channels to walk the talk regarding our interests in South China Sea.
We have no need for a large frigate. It only will be an easily detected juicy target. We should learn from from SG Formidable class in packing more potent firepower onto a hull just slightly larger than Maharajalela. We need more hulls, not make them larger targets.
extra explanation on this point
2x Support tanker USD60 mil (Brand new Indonesia 150m tanker BM5 BM6 replacement, as auxillary ship)
Indonesia has built its own replenishment tanker for Rp 225 Miliar, or about USD15.5 million. The ship is 125.5m long, 16.5m width, top speed of 18 knots, 109 crew and fuel capacity of 5,500m3.
So it is reasonable to budget around USD30 million each for them to build an enlarged 150m replenishment tanker, with hangar facilities for 1 helicopter. It should be able to do long range escort duties of BM5 and BM6 if needed to do so.
http://www.navyrecognition.com/images/stories/news/2018/November/IndoDefence_2018_BMC_Shipyard_Shocases_Latest_Tanker_for_TNI_AL_1.jpg
http://beritatrans.com/2016/08/08/pt-dkb-serahkan-kri-tarakan-905-ke-tni-angkatan-laut/
Can a local shipyard (sarawak maybe, or MMHE) could build a 150m replenishment tanker for less than USD30 million?
@ azlan
” You’ve also overlooked the fact that it’s not the sub per see that makes the overall difference ”
Of course it needs to be deployed in consideration of all other assets. So do i need to add “to be deployed in consideration of all other assets” at every single idea of mine from now on so that you wont put that comment?
Actually it would be a great alternative to FACs to do what FACs is supposed to do, near shore, short range raiding and attacking larger enemy ships by surprise. The surprise element of speed by the FAC is now replaced by the unseen factor of minisubs. With current long range and hi-definition of radars and other sensors, it is difficult for FACs to strike by surprise anymore. Minisubs, lurking in shallow waters would be a surprise element to any enemy. Even if there is actually no subs in that area, the enemy cannot assume that it is not and need to deploy assets to search for the submarine that is actually not there. Our use of FACs to do constabulary duties would be taken up by MMEA PCs, with more ships like the NGPC.
As for range, by 2030 the battery tech, fueled by electric car progress, would trickle into submarines. Even current Li-Ion tech has a power density twice of the normal wet plate batteries.
http://www.udt-global.com/__media/libraries/sensors-and-processing/76—Anders-Wikstrom-Slides.pdf
This is the basic spec of the DG350, it is actually not so mini, about 25% the size of the scorpene.
DG-350 Specification
Displacememt: 291 tons surfaced, 352 tons submerged
Length: 34.8 m
Width: 3 m hull diameter, 3.5 m with hydroplanes
Height: 7.15 m
Crew: 9 + 12 PAX
Range: 2,500 nm, 200 nm on batteries
Speed: 12 kt max, 5 kt cruising, 9 kt surfaced
Operating depth: 150 m
Armament: 3 x 533mm torpedoes standard, plus 2 x lightweight torpedoes or 8 x mines in lateral tubes as mission-specific load
Other: 2 x 4-man SDVs or 2 x 8-man inflatable boats and up to 12 Special Forces containers
Equipment: Passive Sonar, Obstacle Distance Measurement System, SWR Intercept Sonar, Radar Warning Receiver, Electronic Support Measure (OPTIONAL), TV Periscope System (2nd Periscope Optional), HF Transceiver, UHF/VHF Transceiver, Underwater Communication System, Sound Powered Telephone, Intercom Network, Inertial Navigation System, Echo Sounder with Sound Velocity, Doppler Velocity Log
http://www.hisutton.com/images/Drass_DG350.jpg
http://www.hisutton.com/images/Drass_DG350_schematic.jpg
You can see that the DG-350 range is actually longer than even our LMS68, which has a range of only 2000nm. With future Li-Ion batteries, the submerged range could be 400nm. Compare to our scorpenes, with submerged range of 550nm. The addition of these 6 DG-350 to 6 Scorpenes would create a very capable and powerful subsurface fleet, that would enable our political and diplomatic channels to walk the talk regarding our interests in South China Sea.
…. – “Actually it would be a great alternative to FACs to do what FACs is supposed to do, near shore, short range raiding and attacking larger enemy ships by surprise””
The primary traditional role of FACS is littoral sea denial. One shouldn’t equate or conflate a mini sub and a FAC for the simple reason that both are intended and are good for different things …
It’s like saying slapping on a 120mm to a IFV does away with a MBT.
The paper specs aside a mini sub has inherent limitations which is precisely why there haven’t been many takers. Despite advances in technology the key fact remains that the penalty to pay for cramming stuff in a smaller hull is that less things are carried and the actual hull offers less range and endurance.
… – “lurking in shallow waters would be a surprise element to any enemy””
Not if the enemy has ASW assets in the area (shallow waters leaves a sub little room to manoeuvre and hide in) and not if an enemy takes advantage of the limitations suffered by mini subs. The Achilles heel of any diesel electric sub is it’s endurance which is limited by its power supply.
There could also be a scenario where the enemy can fail to physically destroy the sub but nonetheless can prevent the sub from doing what it’s supposed to do – we’ve seen this in various conflicts.
….. – “political and diplomatic channels to walk the talk regarding our interests in South China Sea””
What would really “walk the talk” would be if we spent our cash to better use acquiring and maintaining certain capabilities; including tertiary skills in some areas: as well as committing to a certain level of funding that we can sustain over a certain period.
@ azlan
” littoral sea denial ”
Can a FAC really do this now? It can when it was state of the art 48 years ago and radar technology is still using cathode tubes. Now the technology and fidelity of radars is very high that we can actually take pictures with radar. Sonar tech? It is still an art from as you are listening to millions of different sounds in the ocean. You need to really know what you are trying to find. Nowadays a FAC location can be easily tracked with observation satellites (now you can even use AI to automatically track the ships pattern of life), can easily be hunted down with missile equipped helicopters, and long range anti-ship missiles. Can you really sink a Frigate nowadays with a surprise attack using a FAC? The frigates more powerful radar, ESM and EO systems will detect and track the FAC long before the FAC can fire its missiles to the Frigate.
Isn’t subs are the obvious answer to undertake littoral sea denial now surface ships like FACs are easily detected?
Now and probably in 10 years in the future (as my plan is for the mini subs post 2030), FAC limitations far outweigh the sub in littoral sea denial role. Remember this is an asymmetric strategy, to have an upper hand against a bigger and more powerful navy. Why you can see countries like Iran and North Korea adopting this strategy, even with much more inferior submarines compared to the DG-350. Achilles heel of the sub is its endurance? Does the FAC even have a longer endurance than the DG-350 (2,500nm)? As i said, the advances in battery technology will double the subs submerged range and would be as long as a full-sized conventional submarine. Shallow waters leaves a full-sized submarine little room to maneuver and hide in, but not a small 35m long submarine.
Anyway, do you really think that the FAC would be more capable to do littoral sea denial compared to a mini submarine now and in the future?
“Can you really sink a Frigate nowadays with a surprise attack using a FAC? The frigates more powerful radar, ESM and EO systems will detect and track the FAC long before the FAC can fire its missiles to the Frigate.”
The FACs’ chances are considerably better if they can launch coordinated attacks with the benefit of networked sensors to provide OTH target acquisition and discrimination. No point having the longest ranged missiles if the FACs have to get close to pick out their targets. In other words, there is no substitute for developing a networked force.
“Range: 2,500 nm, 200 nm on batteries … With future Li-Ion batteries, the submerged range could be 400nm. ”
Some concerns: twice the battery capacity might mean twice the time needed to charge them or twice the charging capacity. Also, at what speed does the maximum range apply?
The concept might be worth looking at.
“The upgrades of the FACs will see them with new power packs (engines and generators – not sure whether all brand new or refurbished) and fitted with new mini combat management system (CMS) for better surveillance and fire control – will allow the boats to operate for another 15 years.”
If the navy sees fit to keep the gun FACs for patrol duties, is it worth doing the same with the Laksamanas? Aged or superfluous systems can be stripped to reduce the maintenance burden, systems that are needed for them to serve as patrol boats can be replaced with something easier to maintain.
Reply
Not really sure about the Laksamanas
As you know, the navy is not new to using the Laksamanas for patrol. They haven’t been capable of much else for a while.
If it’s worth getting another 15 years out of the FACs, perhaps the same applies here. The LMS, which are supposed to replace these hulls under 15-5, has turned out to be an expensive proposition and the capabilities it promised have yet to be seen. In the years to come, the navy might be better off considering another platform altogether.
AM – “If it’s worth getting another 15 years out of the FACs, perhaps the same applies here””
There’s simply no alternative.
The problem is they are getting increasingly expensive to maintain and can’t put to sea beyond certain Sea States.
“As you know, the navy is not new to using the Laksamanas for patrol”
That’s all they’re good for; for lack of anything else. There was a time when only the GPMGs were functioning.
…. – “Isn’t subs are the obvious answer to undertake littoral sea denial now surface ships like FACs are easily detected””
You’re looking at things in isolation rather than in totality. You are also looking at all the positive factors rather than weighting all the factors.
A FAC (depicted its limitations provides users with both a peace and wartime utility. A FAC can be used as a show of presence, it can rescue people or board ships, etc, etc, things one can’t do with a sub. It also has better detection capability by virtue of its sensors being above water and it operating along with other assets. You are just looking at the operational
aspects assuming that factors will
always be to the advantage of your mini subs.
Comparisons simply can’t be made by saying ‘z” does something better than ‘x’ thus it’s logical that ‘’z’ should be bought. As pointed out before one simply also can’t make a direct comparison between subs and FACs : both are different
and are good for different things.
It’s like saying it’s ok if we can’t afford fighters as we can buy SAMs and it’s ok if we don’t have MBTs as we can also on a 120mm gun and a panoramic sight on an IFV …. Furthermore FACs have no place on the
RMM’s force structure.
You also overlook a crucial and pertinent fact : the navy – with its limited resources – will have to create a separate or additional shore support/training infrastructure for your mini subs.
“is it worth doing the same with the Laksamanas”
It all depends on the state of their hulls ….
It some way they are in worst shape than the older FACs which is precisely why the RMN didn’t want to spend more than the absolute minimum as the cash could be put to better use.
The commentaries paint a really bleak state of our fleet, and hopefully with LGE and Sabu out the 15 to 5 will be continued by the current and future governments.
Is Boustead capable of upgrading the Keris class without Chinese support?
.. -!”The FACs’ chances are considerably better if they can launch coordinated attacks””
Depends ……
The chances of everything improves if there is coordination in numbers and if surprised is achieved.
If the enemy is expecting an attack and is in alert then complications arise. If despite networking the FACs still haven’t got the SA needed then things can also go ratshit.
Despite whatever advances in technology the inherent problems faced by FACs remain : limited seakeeping, range and endurance; limited range of sensors: degraded sensor performance due to vibration and low freeboards; as well as limited self defence means. We saw this during WW2 with the S Boots and MTBs: the 1973 war and the Battle of the Bubiyan Channel.
@ azlan
” You’re looking at things in isolation rather than in totality ”
Actually i am looking at it in totality, in a global helicopter view from the whole malaysian maritime security situation rather than narrow navy-centric view.
The goal.
To have the most credible deterrant against any nation that wants to colonize our seas and EEZ. Doing nothing is not a credible option.
The mission (one of many).
Littoral sea denial with the limited resources that we have. As a future replacement of the littoral sea denial capability done in the past by FACs.
The execution.
– To use littoral mission submarines like the DG-350 starting 2030 as a part of our littoral sea denial capability.
– replacing FAC surprise attack concept with stealthy, unseen, the fear factor of uncertainty with DG-350 submarine.
– it is magnitues harder to find and destroy a submarine when compared to finding and destroying a FAC.
– as an unpredictable aspect when an enemy is trying to put an amphibious force ashore.
– as a method to covertly strike back at enemy installations, shipping logistics, ports etc.
– as a platform to covertly mine sealanes and port mouths.
– as a platform of infil and exfil our SF teams into enemy territory.
– all peacetime policing and constabulary duties that is done by the FAC to be taken up by MMEA. How this can be done is as per my writing before here
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/apmm-plans/
We need to create a navy that will be our main line of defence against nations that threatens our sovereignty. That is the first and foremost task of the navy. We have our MMEA. And we need to empower it to do what is its primary taskings, as the civilian enforcement force of our seas. They have been given the adequate budget, and we just need to maintain it for 10 more years to build a credible coast guard force.
We also need to realise that we cannot plan our naval future according and following to the mould of much more better budgetted western navies. Our budget is limited and the best way forward is to plan an asymmetric response to a bigger force intent on colonizing our seas. Our peacetime front would be our coast guard, as is their main force to intimidate us is also a coast guard. But as a deterrance factor, we need to beef up our subsea force, to make it more difficult to destroy all of our fleet, and giving us a bigger chance to strike them back.
…. – “Actually i am looking at it in totality””
Then you will realise that the RMN simply does not have the needed resources to develop and maintain the shore training/support infrastructure
needed for 2 different types of subs.
…. – “We also need to realise that we cannot plan our naval future according and following to the mould of much more better budgetted western navies””
You’re stating what is plainly obvious. Nobody has suggested that. If that was the intention the RMN wouldn’t have come up with the 5/15 would it!?
…. – “To have the most credible deterrant against any nation that wants to colonize our seas ””
Again; I have no idea what you mean by “credible” ….. It can mean many things and it can mean nothing.
The navy we need is one we can afford to sustain based on our financial and other constraints driven by the need to address the types of threats we are likely to face … A navy which has trimmed its logistical/support footprint to the minimum; rather than enlarging its footprint by self defeating and unsustained moves like having two different types of subs to support ..
…. – “all peacetime policing and constabulary duties that is done by the FAC to be taken up by MMEA”
… “That is the first and foremost task of the navy. We have our MMEA. And we need to empower it to do what is its primary”
With respect to your writings this topic has been done to death with. The intention has long been for the MMEA to eventually take over all the constabulary type duties performed by a variety of RMN assets; whether FACs, Kedahs or Lekius.
…. – “– it is magnitues harder to find and destroy a submarine when compared to finding and destroying a FAC”
You are being simplistic but things are relative ….. Subs also have disadvantages compared to surface assets.
Successful employment is dependent on factors like whether the enemy knows subs are in the area…The enemy will have not only surface and air ASW units deployed but will also likely have its own subs in the area and will take full advantage of limitations suffered by subs: namely battery supply and problems with detection.
In shallow waters subs will also have less room to manoeuvre and although might not be physically destroyed might be prevented from doing their job. A smart adversary will attempt to prevent a non AIP sub from charging its batteries and a major nightmare for a sub is to run out of battery supply ….
– “– as an unpredictable aspect when an enemy is trying to put an amphibious force ashore””
You are looking at hypothetical scenarios which is fine but if we want to include the various hypothetical scenarios that we need to justify buying something; the list could be endless.
We are unlikely to face a scenario where anyone would land troops amphibiously on our shores – higher chances of troops crossing a common land border. If it’s the Spratlys; one doesn’t have to land a single person in any of of our reefs; merely to control the surrounding waters and deny us the ability to supply our troops there.
… – “But as a deterrance factor, we need to beef up our subsea force””
A “deterrence factor” which would really make anyone think twice would to build up the capability to employ a combination of assets to work seamlessly and in unison. That’s what enables a “deterrence factor; not over reliance on any one single type is asset in the hope or belief that it will offset deficiencies in other areas or the hope that that one asset will be a panacea.
@ azlan
” The mission (one of many) ”
Minisubs are just a subset of things we need for littoral sea denial. When you talk about FACs, should i assume that is everything there is for us to do littoral sea denial? no right.
” various hypothetical scenarios that we need to justify buying something; the list could be endless ”
Isnt preventing amphibious attack a valid reason of our seaward defence? Not as if I am talking about preventing aliens from mars to attack our country.
” Then you will realise that the RMN simply does not have the needed resources to develop and maintain the shore training/support infrastructure
needed for 2 different types of subs ”
Remember that resources have been freed from FAC and OPV duties. Minisubs operate more like a fighter jet rather than a ship, it has less than a dozen crew. Trainings could be done on simulators. So it is not something that will take up huge amount of resources, when compared to OPV and FAC.
… – “you talk about FACs, should i assume that is everything there is for us to do littoral sea denial””
The key key difference is that I’ve acknowledged the various limitations of FACs, I’m not suggesting that FACs provide any fast and easy answer to whatever deficiencies we have and I’ve pointed out that FACs have no place in the RMN’s force structure.
You on the other hand are going on with the virtues of mini subs, suggesting that they are an alternative of FACs and have not made any mention of the limitations or drawbacks faced by mini subs.
… – “Trainings could be done on simulators””
Really? You”re seriously saying that the use of simulators will lessen the impact and strain on resources of having to create another shore training//support infrastructure to cater for another sub? People will have to trained operate and support this sub, parts will have to stocked, etc …
… – “.inisubs operate more like a fighter jet rather than a ship, it has less than a dozen crew”
And what are the drawbacks of having a hull that size?
You previously equated mini subs with FACs: making a direct comparison between them. Now you doing the same with mini
subs and jets. Irrespective of whether it’s a 4 man COSMOS, a sub the displacement of a Type 206 or a double hulled ocean boat the size of a frigate they all require a shore support infrastructure and in the RMN’s case it is resourced strapped in resources.
… – “Remember that resources have been freed from FAC and OPV duties”
The RMN’s FACs/patrol boats/corvettes still perform constabulary type duties; there is a large logistical/support footprint due to the various types of ships operated (many with different and incompatible systems), there is an acute overall shortage of hulls and financial and manpower resources are stretched…….
…. – “Isnt preventing amphibious attack a valid reason of our seaward defence””
It is but such a scenario is unlikely to materialise for real and we focus on other more likely and pressing concerns.
…. – “. So it is not something that will take up huge amount of resources, when compared to OPV and FAC””
Whether it takes up half or 1/3 of the resources it still takes up resources.
Your mini sub will contain a propulsion system, gearbox, generators, optronics, rudder assembly, batteries, torpedo loading system, electronics and literally dozens of other items/parts/components which will all need maintenance, parts to be stocked and people to be continuously trained; on top of the RMN having to do the same for the Scorpenes.
@ azlan
Still talking about RMN patrol boats/facs and corvettes when we can plan to phase them out and free all the resources that are currently supporting the various types of ships. When we can plan to leave constabulary duties to MMEA and make TLDM focus on more on the warfighting capabilities.
Getting 6 scorpenes also needs resources. As is 9 Gowinds and 4 Type 31s. We have 20 years ahead of us (2021 to 2040) to really execute this, it is not going to happen tomorrow.
On the DG350. It has 9 crewmenbers. If all subs have 2 crews, that is 108. Say you need 200 navy technicians to support this, then it is around 300. Building a covered hangar beside the existing scorpene hangar could house all 6 under roof, with subs not on duty parked in the hangar like a fighter jet. The heavylift roro auxillary ship could also be used to transfer the subs between east and west malaysia if needed. Offshore OSV could be used as a submarine tender, similar to our LSTs used as FAC tender in the 70s and 80s.
If a shooting war starts in South China Sea, we must take into consideration the ships of other navies will also be fighting against the agressor. We cannot act neutral as it is our seas the agressor is taking away from us. We should also expect our frigates to be targetted early on. Submarines would be the most survivable naval asset that we can rely on. To strike back we would need to depend on our submarines and our long range fighters to hit back on the agressor naval ships.
If my plan is unworkable, show me something that is better than this. Show me something that can give a bloody nose, something that can stand up and strike back to a wannabe sea colonizer. I believe my plan for TLDM and MMEA is an improvement to the original 15 to 5 plan is. So surprise me.
… – budget is limited and the best way forward is to plan an asymmetric response to a bigger force intent on colonizing our seas””
Who is this “bigger force”? I would assume it’s China you mean? Can’t be Vietnam, Brunei, Taiwan or the Philippines.
You mention an “asymmetric” response but this “asymmetric” response has to be realistic and within our means and we have to take into account that a adversary will be fully aware of our “asymmetric” response and will take measures to counter it …..
If we look at things devoid of any patriotic chest thumping rhetoric; it’s as plain as day that nothing we do will deter China. This is not to say that we are doing nothing and are opening our trousers and offering our rears to China but who are we? Of course if things get sour we’ll defend the “tanah air” but who are we to go against China when China doesn’t hesitate to go play hard ball with the likes of the U.S. and Japan?
What we can do is to continue what we’re doing : maintain a presence in the Spratlys to the best of our ability and to engage China via diplomatic (whether on. a bilateral basis or via the UN or ASEAN) means whilst maintaining our existing lines of communications and relationships with other countries. We also hope of course that the politicians will adequately fund the MAF enable or to deal with the threats it can realistically deal with.
If we’re honest with ourselves; nothing we do will deter China if it intends to seize our possessions in the Spratlys. We deploy 5 ships and they’ll deploy 20, we deploy 5 subs they’ll deploy 10 with another 5 on standby and we sink 4 ships they’ll sink half or all we have. Nothing we do will change this. To think or to suggest otherwise is to engage in delusional wishful thinking. To also suggest that we are “doing nothing” is plainly false ..
Putting aside your ideas for a AV-8 brigade, mini subs and other ideas; given the current political and economic environment; we should count ourselves lucky if the politicians can actually commit to what already has been agreed to in principle; no matter how modest they may be.
@ azlan
” but who are we to go against China when China doesn’t hesitate to go play hard ball with the likes of the U.S. and Japan? ”
Where is your malaysia boleh attitude? Of course we are not going against china, but we must be able to hit and strike back hard if china takes away our EEZ, not just do nothing at it. Does Lt Adnan have the same attitude as yours when japan invaded malaya? Does Vietnam just roll over and surrender when america’s might attacked them? A defeatist attitude is what going to lose us our sovereignty and our seas.
…. – “Where is your malaysia boleh attitude””
Right … So just because I don’t indulge in nationalistic chest thumping; there is no “Malaysia boleh” spirit on my part?
…. – “, not just do nothing at it.“”
There you go again. Whose “doing nothing”? Each intrusion is is intercepted, we keep a close watch on the area and we send a protest note every time there’s an intrusion. We also have plans to improve our capabilities. You seriously expect us to do more under the present circumstances? Let me remind you that we are on a peacetime footing and that there are also factors related to the economy and regional security to weight in …..
…. – “Does Lt Adnan have the same attitude as yours when japan invaded malaya? Does Vietnam just roll over and surrender when america’s might attacked them? A defeatist attitude is what going to lose us our sovereignty and our seas.”
Lt.Adnan was in a full scale war.
Vietnam was also in scale war …
We are not …. You are find of rushing into comparisons but at least make the proper ones …
With regards handle it handles the SCS Vietnam has in public a more assertive attitude but still has to make amends with China for economic reasons. It also has centuries of strife with China ………
If you want to call me “defeatist” merely because I look at things from a dispassionate perspective minus your chest thumping rhetoric; knock yourself out. No skin off my back ….
Address the issue or argument rather than resorting to calling others “defeatist” or lacking certain spirits …. I’f you’re unable to do that, well ….
…. – “believe my plan for TLDM and MMEA is an improvement to the original 15 to 5 plan is. So surprise me””
There you are falling back to the same script when you reach an impasse or when someone doesn’t go along with your narrative. Also I didn’t criticise your plan per see : merely pointing our that certain things, like you idea for mini subs doesn’t provide the answers you think they do and that certain direct comparisons of things are flawed and based on misconceptions.
I have explained in detail and in a coherent manner why certain things you proposed are not practical or suitable. I don’t have to take a page out of your book by doing fantasy/alternate plans.
Why should I? I don’t need any self convincing and I don’t have to keep referring or reminding others of my fantasy/alternate plans.
I also don’t just focus on the positives without any consideration to the non positive parts merely to strengthen my narrative or to assume that just because things look great on paper or on shiny OEM catalogues that it will be same in reality ….
Azlan “If we’re honest with ourselves; nothing we do will deter China if it intends to seize our possessions in the Spratlys. ”
… “Of course we are not going against china, but we must be able to hit and strike back hard if china takes away our EEZ, not just do nothing at it. A defeatist attitude is what going to lose us our sovereignty and our seas.”
We cannot win a general military confrontation with China. But it is within our means to survive and remain competitive in limited confrontations, and in that sense military force has an important role to play in the political resolution to a crisis.
In safeguarding our tanah air, we have to be able to impose costs on the aggressor, and in turn be willing to incur costs. If for example driving us off our reefs and driving our vessels away is a quick and cheap and affair, the chances of it being done increases. If our outposts are blockaded, we must have options. We must attempt to go around it, in the process risking a collision or shooting incident. We would then have to seek international support for a political solution later. What we mustn’t do is leave ourselves with no option but to pack up and go. We obviously have to invest in our forces so that the incident isn’t too one sided and over too quickly, and our men don’t come off too badly.
Nobody is suggesting that we escalate to a general shooting war that we can’t win.
The best we can do is to fix our procurement so we do not waste what little money we do spend on defence. No more rojak procurement so more people can have garage full of kereta sports bikin. 8 years after this article (https://www.malaysiandefence.com/laksamana-class-frigates-and-the-ghost-of-amin-shah/) are we any better? We cannot defend our EEZ with 60 year old boats.
AM – “ in that sense military force has an important role to play in the political resolution to a crisis””
It certainly does and I wasn’t suggesting otherwise. I’m not suggesting we be passive and let others do what they want. I’m also against the false notion that we “are doing nothing” …..
We have long standing deep rooted issues that have to be rectified; in policy, mindset and procurement. Sorting out these issues is what will make others take notice; not the procurement of any single asset: no matter how great it’s apparent advantages are.
It will also be great if the MAF could focus most of its attention on the SCS : it can’t as there are various other areas it also has to focus on. Of course this is a military forum and our discussions will be centred on that but how we go about planning our response in case things gets worse is also factored on by economic and other factors.
@ AM
” We cannot win a general military confrontation with China. But it is within our means to survive and remain competitive in limited confrontations, and in that sense military force has an important role to play in the political resolution to a crisis.
In safeguarding our tanah air, we have to be able to impose costs on the aggressor, and in turn be willing to incur costs. …… What we mustn’t do is leave ourselves with no option but to pack up and go. We obviously have to invest in our forces so that the incident isn’t too one sided and over too quickly, and our men don’t come off too badly.
Nobody is suggesting that we escalate to a general shooting war that we can’t win. ”
Thank you very much. Your wordings sums up prefectly what my thoughts are on this. Probably because i am a technical analytical type of person, my intents are somewhat blurred under all those fact and figures. Anyway right now our leaders does not have much option, and we should not be in our current situation in the future. And to do this, because of our budgetary situation, it would be a very long term incremental plan, not like i want minisubs right now without a budget available. But we need to do something, even if it takes 20 years to completely execute it all.
@ AM
” We cannot win a general military confrontation with China. But it is within our means to survive and remain competitive in limited confrontations, and in that sense military force has an important role to play in the political resolution to a crisis.
In safeguarding our tanah air, we have to be able to impose costs on the aggressor, and in turn be willing to incur costs. …… What we mustn’t do is leave ourselves with no option but to pack up and go. We obviously have to invest in our forces so that the incident isn’t too one sided and over too quickly, and our men don’t come off too badly.
Nobody is suggesting that we escalate to a general shooting war that we can’t win. ”
Thank you very much. Your wordings sums up prefectly what my thoughts are on this. Probably because i am a technical analytical type of person, my intents are somewhat blurred under all those fact and figures. Anyway right now our leaders does not have much option, and we should not be in our current situation in the future. And to do this, because of our budgetary situation, it would be a very long term incremental plan, not like i want minisubs right now without a budget available. But we need to do something, even if it takes 20 years to completely execute it all.
Encik – “No more rojak procurement so more people can have garage full of kereta sports bikin”””
We have to be realistic as to the types of threats the MAF can deal with and the types it can’t.
We need an MAF to be equipped in such as way that it can meets its operational commitments and also can be sustainable. No point buying shiny gear if in the long run we can’t afford the needed upkeep.
The long-standing policy of putting the interests of the local industry first has to stop or we’ll confine making the same mistakes over and over again and we’ll only have ourselves to blame.
AM – “We obviously have to invest in our forces so that the incident isn’t too one sided and over too quickly, and our men don’t come off too badly””
Which we have been doing to some extent: reflected in the purchase of several items over the years. The problem is we don’t fully get what we pay for in terms of actual capabilities or cost effectiveness because of flawed policies.
AM – “In safeguarding our tanah air, we have to be able to impose costs on the aggressor, and in turn be willing to incur costs”
Naturally. And the costs we incur must we weighted in relation to overall factors pertinent to the economy and overall stability. There will also always be a limit to the level of costs we’re willing to incur.
With regards to the hardware the immediate priority should be MPAs, helicopters, UASs, etc, rather than anything else. If we get sidetracked and end up getting other stuff; we’ll be stuck in the “little of everything but not enough of anything” rut.
Back to the details.
On TLDM Auxillary Squadron.
To be modeled after the Royal Fleet Auxillary and US Military Sealift Command. Crewed by TLDM sailors and civilians drafted into the PSSTLDM.
tasks
– logistics and operational support ships for TLDM
– submarine rescue and support
– logistics bridge support from west to east malaysia
– replenishment support
– peacetime convoy escort
– sea bases
– Littoral warfare operations and covert operations support of PASKAL.
Types of ship:
Semisubmersible floating base
This would be a conversion of used civilian oil tanker, something a bit bigger than the BM5 or BM6, with lower decks cut out and able to be flooded to become instant docking area for RHIBs and FICs. Operating platform for TLDM UAVs. Able to long term support of around 150 soldiers/ SF. Short term support of 400 soldiers. This would be the main operating base for any low intensity conflict happening in our littorals. The ships would look like this:
http://www.bairdmaritime.com/wp-content/uploads/media/k2/items/src/893c4fdc824f051f07606f44d5d60e5a.jpg
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Images/TeamShips/PEOShips/ESB-ESD/USNS%20Lewis%20B%20Puller%20(TESB%203).jpg
Mainly based around eastern sabah but could be quickly mobilised for HADR tasks to any disaster-hit shores.
Replenishment oiler.
Basically a replacement of the BM5 and BM6 as long range escort ship with the addition of replenishment systems. Hangar to take a medium helicopter plus a UAV. davits for large RHIBs. Around the same size of current BM5 and BM6.
Heavylift RORO
Used civilian RORO/LOLO, would be nice to have FLOFLO capability. Support to MRSS capability. Able to transfer MBTs, IFVs, minisubs, Patrol boats, FICs from West to East Malaysia. To be available for civilian cargo charter when not needed.
http://atlantidesgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/heavy_lift_carrier_for_sale_atl_1115_hl.jpg
Submarine Rescue
MV Mega Bakti
http://pbs.twimg.com/media/BjVtWsgCAAAdaw-.jpg
Offshore OSV
Used multipurpose offshore support ship of around 70-90m in length. For Logistics resupply to offshore bases. For PASKAL support. For MCM mothership, For hydrographic survey support. As minisub tender. For search and rescue, salvage support, offshore rescue tug.
http://img.offshore-mag.com/files/base/ebm/os/image/2020/03/2003OFFvess_p01.5e7a50cd5a016.png
http://dvzpv6x5302g1.cloudfront.net/AcuCustom/Sitename/DAM/054/Southeast_Asia_MMA_Pinnacleweb.jpg
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Oivind_Midtgaard/publication/323146917/figure/fig1/AS:593546537078784@1518523930707/Potential-concept-for-future-Norwegian-naval-MCM.png
…. – “Replenishment oiler””
Why do we need a “replenishment oiler”?
Our ships mainly spend about 2 weeks at sea and if they have to extend their patrol; carry reserve fuel and needed supplies which ate used at the discretion of the CO. Also, irrespective of whether they are well within our waters or along the periphery they are never more then 2 days sailing tine to the nearest base or port.
It’s for these reasons that although we have a need for a replenishment/MRSS ship; actual replenishment of ships at sea with regards to fuel is not considered a priority. The Saktis and before that the LSTs did act as tenders for the FACs and PVs but the RMN’s future force structure does not call for FACs and there are only a pair of PVs left at Sandakan which don’t venture far.
The other larger ships we operate have sufficient fuel, water and food supplies for the types of patrols we routinely undertake.
Another issue is that not all of our ships are actually equipped with the needed fuel line transfers for refuelling at sea. If it’s out of areas ops; chances are slim we’ll do it and if we fo; refuelling and replenishment of essential supplies will be done at foreign bases as was the case with Ops Fajar.
If your referring to a requisitioned commercial ship that can serve a variety of roles then yes but that’s what the requirement for the MRSSs are for. I provided the reasons why we don’t need a “replenishment oiler” per see (whether it’s a commissioned or an auxiliary ship) because that was the title of your sub heading.
Like with the army’s TA; any expansion of the RMN’s “ TLDM Auxillary Squadron” (irrespective of what it’s modelled on) is wholly dependent on sufficient funding but at present and for the foreseeable future even funding for the RMN is tight. All 3 armed services of given the chance would like to do more with reserve/volunteer units but as ever funding is tight.
KA Bunga Mas 5 is now deployed to shadow the chinese ships near the petronas chartered West Capella drill ship.
http://scontent.fmkz1-1.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t1.0-9/fr/cp0/e15/q65/95967238_3035604543129208_2893876254543446016_o.jpg?_nc_cat=100&_nc_sid=110474&_nc_ohc=n5AObuHl7b0AX9wg1JP&_nc_ht=scontent.fmkz1-1.fna&_nc_tp=14&oh=94f648bdb80acc60dc50f27b2fd6c3a6&oe=5ED526A2
To the crews of BM5, selamat bertugas and make malaysia proud.
” With regards to the hardware the immediate priority… ”
IMO for RMK12 2021-2025 The immediate hardware priority in regards to the South China Sea Situation are:
TUDM
– CN-235MPA conversion, all 6 of the transport version.
– MALE UAV.
TLDM
– To complete building all 6 Gowinds
MMEA
– To complete building all 3 Damen 1800 OPV.
– Batch 2 of 3 more Damen 1800 OPV
– Additional used OPV (2-3 units) as a stopgap to more brand new OPVs later. Used South Korean Pohang corvettes or even Ulsan frigates would do. Getting the Pohang or Ulsan would also be very useful if we want to go for Type 31s post 2030 with their generous amount of 76mm super rapido and 40mm DARDO guns that can be removed and fitted to the Type 31s.
http://i.pinimg.com/originals/15/d2/19/15d2192da81b2a4c2c1b092fed11fadd.jpg
@….
I mentioned about Bunga Mas 5 being deployed at West Capella position but somehow the comment didn’t appear. I am pretty sure I followed all the guidelines and no profanities either…unless the comment system is buggy.
In any case maybe they should put some of the Army’s 155mm guns on deck, or Astros, and have the artillery crew do some firing drills near the CCG.
I am hoping TUDM will go for the Kuwaiti Hornets instead. Expand the hornet fleet to maybe around 12 to a full squadron.
As for TLDM, Gowinds are the priority. If they can add additional ships then go for it otherwise perhaps the gov should fund for additional LMS so that FACs and Laksamanas could be retired for good.
I think MMEA should concentrate on getting more Damen 1800 hulls. Upgunned if necessary, I mean I don’t think it’s that hard to add some mortars and grenade launchers on it..
@ azlan
I foresee the replenishment ships as a replacement to do tasks now done by BM5 and BM6. As the spaces of the BM5 and BM6 are left empty, why not a replacement use this space to store fuel available for replenishment? At first I am considering conversions of a container vessel, similar to BM5, BM6 and the Canadian Project Resolve. But when seeing the cost of ships that can be done by Indonesia, why not build them new?
A replenishment ship could be used in plenty of ways. If you have a time constraint, say a frigate on duty needs to be relocated urgently due to an emergency, there would be time lost if the ships need to get to a port to refuel and replenish. It could be used to extend on station time of frigates if say there is no other ships available to replace the frigate if it needs to return to port. I would also be useful for long range deployment of Royal Malaysian Navy Task Groups to undertake international taskings, or going to exercises overseas.
As for your statement of some ships unable to replenish at sea, the RAS rig is for the transfer of fuel and stores at speed. All ships can be replenished at sea, even without the RAS rig, easiest is to stop and transfer fuel lines over the sides. Other methods include over the stern method where the tanker trails a fuel line to be picked up by the frigate following behind it.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/39/Astern_Replenishment_At_Sea.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underway_replenishment
As for replenishment tasks should be done by MRSS, that is what the title of the ship should include. But so far all offered designs are pure LPDs.
As for the priority of this, yes it should not be at the top of our priority list.
Back to our priority for RMK12 2021-2025, if we prioritize as per my point previously, we would have by 2025 a large ship fleet of
– 6 Gowind frigates
– 2 Lekiu frigates
– 2 Kasturi frigates
– 6 Kedah OPV
– 6 Damen 1800 OPV MMEA
– 2 Ex-japan OPV MMEA
– 2 Ex-Musytari OPV MMEA
– 2 Ex-Korean (pohang or ulsan) OPV MMEA
In all by 2025, 28 large ships to patrol our EEZ, to afford around 9 continuously out at sea.
@ ASM
the system is very buggy.
” In any case maybe they should put some of the Army’s 155mm guns on deck, or Astros, and have the artillery crew do some firing drills near the CCG ”
We should not do any escalation of that type. But high altitude CAP of the area by MKMs, and probably a periscope picture of the Haiyang Dizhi 8.
http://amti.csis.org/chinese-survey-ship-escalates-three-way-standoff/
… – “why not a replacement use this space to store fuel available for replenishment”
In principle the idea is great but from an operational perspective it’s not really needed for the reasons I’ve already given. Disagree all you want; I’m just stating the facts.
Which is why refuelling at sea is something we rarely do for the simple reason that by an large we don’t have a need for it. Having the future MRSSs have the ability to perform refuelling at sea is also not on the list of priorities.
…. – “As for your statement of some ships unable to replenish at sea, the RAS rig is for the transfer of fuel and stores at speed””
All RMN ships are able to perform line transfers of men and supplies but not all ships actually have the fuel line transfers (with the hose rig) to enable refuelling at sea. Line transfers to transfer personnel and supplies and fuel transfers to enable fuel to be transferred are two different things ….. One some of our ships the fuel line transfers actually deteriorate due to a lack of use.
I have a friend who has done it. From personal experience he said it’s hard and tricky to do. Depends on the sea state as both ships have to maintain a certain course and speed for the duration of the transfer. A slight miscalculation can result in a collision.
… – “A replenishment ship could be used in plenty of ways. If you have a time constraint, say a frigate on duty needs to be relocated urgently due to an emergency””
All due respect but thank you..
I’m aware of the need and utility of a replenishment ship. M
We can go on and on about the advantages of being able to refuel at sea but by an large; due to geography and operational commitments; refuelling at sea is not a priority for us. Especially compared to the 1980’a and 1990’s when the bulk of the fleet consisted of smaller ships with lesser range and endurance.
ASM – In any case maybe they should put some of the Army’s 155mm guns on deck, or Astros, and have the artillery crew do some firing drills near the CCG.“”
Seriously?? Are you aware how thin the upper decks of modern ships are and the general lack of free deck space on our ships?
The other factor is why on earth would we do this? For what practical and effective reason??
You need to take note that everything we do has to have to consequences factored in. The Chinese are intruding in our waters and being assertive but they are not being aggressive like they have with others. Doing a live shoot in the area or other forms of muscle flexing will look great but will bring us no payoff and in response the Chinese can also flex their muscles.
ASM – “Upgunned if necessary, I mean I don’t think it’s that hard to add some mortars and grenade launchers on it”
What on earth for?
MMEA ships are armed for self defence – period/full stop. If there weapons are used for than self defence and go beyond the light/middle calibre deck guns and small arms then they are being misused.
On the subject of replenishment/supply; I see the need for a class of (“supply craft”) call them what you want) to replace or augment the FTVs.
Primary role would be resupply/personnel transfer in the Spratlys. This role of course is also currently performed by the CB-90s but they dint have the internal space the FTVs have.
Displacement would be similar or slightly larger than the FTVs. Waterjets, carrying capacity for 15-20 personnel, shallow draught (very essential for the Spratlys) and sufficient range to reach any of our reefs from Labuan.
Comms/sensor fit would be basic : Furuno (or commercial equivalent) nav radar, GPS and radios. Hull could be any existing one which suits the requirements. The FTVs are of an Australian designed originally intended for a ferry company
@Azlan
“Seriously?? Are you aware how thin the upper decks of modern ships are and the general lack of free deck space on our ships? The other factor is why on earth would we do this? For what practical and effective reason??\”
I was remarking about putting artillery on ships like Bunga Emas 5, as my comments were in reference to that ship. Obviously there won’t be any space if you put them on frigates or corvettes, but on vessels like Bunga Emas 5 there’s ample deck space. And I don\’t see why not, you can provide an auxiliary vessel with some sort of offensive capability, even limited offshore bombardment. This idea is not new, the US has been testing it although the US is using a LPD. I doubt that we can afford a LPD, so we make do with what we have.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15410/himars-goes-to-sea-us-marines-now-fire-guided-artillery-rockets-from-ships
“What on earth for? MMEA ships are armed for self defence – period/full stop. If there weapons are used for than self defence and go beyond the light/middle calibre deck guns and small arms then they are being misused.”
I don’t see the issue of these vessels being equipped with mortars and grenade launchers. Even the police have grenades in their armoury, and like our police the MMEA has dual military and civilian roles. So IMO just adding grenade launchers and mortars are not unreasonable when considering these roles. Besides I didn’t call for these vessels to be armed with anti ship missiles and the like.
@ azlan
On FTV replacement. Right now both FTVs are used as patrol boats off sandakan.
But as the navy seemingly wants 8 more LMS68 in RMK12 2021-2025, the logistics mission can be served by buying used OSV ships.
If it was my way, the FTV will be a task of LMS, with my LMS-B2 concept.
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/another-perspective-lms/
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LMS-concept-2.jpg
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/LMSB1.jpg
Option B IMO for LMS in RMK12 is
– hot transfer all 4 LMS68 to MMEA.
– reboot the LMS programme.
– get 15 LMS-B concept of 12 LMS-B1 and 3 LMS-B2 for a total of usd225 million (usd15 million each)
– maintain the CS/VN3 30mm guns on LMS-B. Create a 2x TEU side by side sized missile module of 4x C-705 AShM and 32 vertical launch CM-501GA missiles. IMO the CM-501GA is an ideal missile for LMS/FAC (even though it is not currently used as such) as it is small, vertically launched, can target fast boats, other FACs and even helicopters out to 40km range.
http://army-tech.net/forum/index.php?attachments/2950696-jpg.53255/
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cm-501ga.htm
The LMS-B IMO would be a better multi-purpose, and littoral fighting ship than the LMS68.
@ ASM
Doing what you suggest, although doable, defeats the very reason that we should use coast guard ships for standoffs, which is to stand your ground without escalating the situation
Yes you can put ASTROS on decks, if a scenario like lahad dato repeats 10x the size and there is no other way to get there other than by sea.
But in a standoff? Only things we should shoot, even that at last resort are water cannons and LRADs. Right now china just bring their coast guard. We dont want to escalate this when currently we are not in a good situation to really fight back.
@….. Perhaps I\’ve caused some confusion about my comments on the MMEA.
I was talking about the MMEA loadout in a general sense, not simply in this stand-off situation. IMO any MMEA vessel should be armed with more than simply just machine guns, considering some other countries’ coast guard ships are armed with a 57mm cannon. I don\’t think patrol vessels armed with grenade launchers and mortars will attract a lot of attention.
Again, I am referring to the MMEA ship weapon config in a general sense, and not particularly in the current stand off situation with China.
Obviously firing artillery rounds at near CCG position is not a good idea. My comment there was meant to be taken in jest, result of continuous frustrations with that belligerent country.
China has stolen reefs before. How long before this tactic is used to steal petroleum oil wells?
After completing the exploration drilling, West Capella will depart the location in a few weeks time. Can we defend the well from being taken over by China?
ASM – “I was remarking about putting artillery on ships like Bunga Emas 5, as my comments were in reference to that””
The ship is an auxiliary/support ship. Why go to the extent of placing artillery on its decks? BTW one can’t just place artillery on a deck and operate it from there.
ASM – “So IMO just adding grenade launchers and mortars are not unreasonable when considering these roles””
Boarding parties are armed with assault rifles and pistols and are covered by pintle mounted GPMGs. Based on the context of what the MMEA does I don’t see how much value grenades add to the equation.
….
The FTVs are still used for supply runs. Especially to the reefs apart from Layang Layang which are surrounded by very shallow water.
…. – Right now both FTVs are used as patrol boats off sandakan“”
They are still used for supply runs.
ASM – “sidering some other countries’ coast guard ships are armed with a 57mm cannon. I don\’t think patrol vessels armed with grenade launchers and mortars will attract a lot of attention”
Well different countries have different ideas as to how their coast guards should be armed and the roles they perform.
It’s not about “attention” but what is needed from an operational perspective.
… this will probably interest you. What do you think? Should we do sealift with fewer, larger hulls or more numerous, smaller hulls?
https://news.usni.org/2019/09/20/marines-navy-both-considering-something-like-an-offshore-support-vessel-to-supplement-amphibs
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33299/navy-wants-to-buy-30-new-light-amphibious-warships-to-suport-radical-shift-in-marine-ops
AM – “ Should we do sealift with fewer, larger hulls or more numerous, smaller hulls””
To a slightly different extent that is a question which can also be asked of other categories of ships.
ASM – “Obviously firing artillery rounds at near CCG position is not a good idea””
Doing anything that would alter or upset the status quo is “not a good idea”. The trick is how to respond in line with one’s obligations to maintain one’s sovereignty in what is a peacetime environment; without raising tensions or causing the other side to retaliate.
For the present; what we really need are additional air and surface assets to improve our overall ability to maintain constant and adequate coverage in the area. Ideally the main organisation should be the MMEA with the RMN ready to intervene or assist.
@ Azlan
“The ship is an auxiliary/support ship. Why go to the extent of placing artillery on its decks? BTW one can’t just place artillery on a deck and operate it from there.\”
I know. Hence the remark above to … that it was a comment made it in jeste. Not meant to being taken seriously in this situation. However IMO it\’s a viable option to perform offshore bombardment seeing that most ships nowadays are ill-equipped to perform these kind of missions.
\”Boarding parties are armed with assault rifles and pistols and are covered by pintle mounted GPMGs. Based on the context of what the MMEA does I don’t see how much value grenades add to the equation.\” I envision a scenario if they have to tackle swarms of fast boats and the like. Little bit like how Iran is going around the US fleet in the Persian gulf. Probably a repeat case of Lahad Datu.
On an unrelated note, any info on current status of the remaining LMSes? Is China going to deliver these ships to despite the stand off that we are currently having?
@Azlan
“Doing anything that would alter or upset the status quo is “not a good idea”. The trick is how to respond in line with one’s obligations to maintain one’s sovereignty in what is a peacetime environment; without raising tensions or causing the other side to retaliate”
As I mentioned before, it was a remark made in JEST out of frustration reading the current situation at the borders. That’s all there is to it.
@ AM
My take?
We don’t actually need a specific marine corps type of force and support. What we need is a way to rapidly move heavy equipment from east to west malaysia or vise versa. Personnel could be moved quickly by air. So not having say a LPD for vehicle beach landings would not be detrimental to our defence. 2 MRSS, plus all the auxillary ships a proposed above while supported by chartered ships in peacetime would be adequate to support the movement of heavy equipment between both parts of malaysia.
As for the MRSS, i would prefer it to be a large modified fast RORO design, which can carry the men and equipment of 1 whole mechanized or cavalry or armoured regiment/battalion. Refer to my earlier post above for pictures. This could be had for around usd100-150 million each.
For the next 10 years, we should improve the capability of our forces in sabah and sarawak. What i propose is to have by 2030
– 2 cavalry regiment with gempita and JLTV (1 moved from west msia)
– 2 motorized/mechanized battalion with HMPV
– 2 artillery regiment with 105mm howitzers
– 1 artillery regiment with 155mm towed howitzers
– 1 squadron of medium utility helicopters (blackhawks)
– 1 ISTAR regiment with artillery location radar and UAV.
Then we should start a prepositioned equipment program in east malaysia to lessen the need for urgent materials transport.
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Corps_Prepositioning_Program-Norway
For our defence of the littorals (the so called amphibioimus force), the proposed enlargement of our PASKAL force would be the main component of this task. I would prefer this to be modelled to the swedish and norwegian coastal jaegers, which unlike an orthodox marines force, it is not meant to be just a landing force to fight ashore, but a force specialized in fighting in the littoral enviroment. New FICs and CB90s would be the waterborne IFV for this force, with the support of more fightinglike LMS hopefully.
All the auxillary ships could also be drafted as mobile staging platforms for the PASKAL force. The semisubmersible floating base, is specially designed to perform as a mobile floating staging platform for littoral forces.
@ azlan
” Ideally the main organisation should be the MMEA with the RMN ready to intervene or assist ”
Yes, that should be the proper way.
@….
About the forces in East Malaysia, may I add
– around 6-8 NGPVs/LMS or similar number of MMEA patrol vessels
– some Hornets to be stationed in Labuan (if we decide to buy them)
I do support the enlargement of PASKAL, but I doubt that it could be the main element in the amphibious force. The attrition rate from training is quite high and I don’t think you can fill in the numbers. Maybe something along the lines of Para but dedicated towards littoral operations?
… – “Then we should start a prepositioned equipment program in east malaysia””
If the new division is equipped the way it should be and if existing units are also given attention; there would be much less of a need to preposition stuff there are the stuff would already be there.
I would like to see training areas that can accommodate mech combined arms training and line 155mm fire. No point having such and such units there are training areas that can accommodate them.
…. – “For our defence of the littorals (the so called amphibioimus force), the proposed enlargement of our PASKAL force would be the main component of this task. I would prefer this to be modelled to the swedish and norwegian coastal jaegers, which unlike an orthodox marines force””
As with all similar units worldwide the main problem is attracting the right amount of people who can qualify for selection and to endure manpower quality is not diluted due to unit expansion; a common problem.
…. – “swedish and norwegian coastal jaegers, which unlike an orthodox marines force””
Both units are structured for their unique operating environment. I would argue that three is no such thing as a “orthodox marine force: as all units – whether the USMC, Korda Marinir or Russian Naval
Infantry – although sharing similarities differ in many especially; expected given each has different requirements.
… – “Yes, that should be the proper way””
Which we’ve actually agreed on on multiple occasions.
…. – “it is not meant to be just a landing force to fight ashore, but a force specialized in fighting in the littoral enviroment””
Well this would similar to Gerak Khas which comprises a pair of light units modelled on the Royal
Marines and a special ops unit which is our SAS/Spestnaz/Green Beret/ Kopassus equivalent.
I would actually like a separate unit which can perform a variety of roles including garrisoning the Spratlys.
We’ve discussed this before. It can be called the “RMN Regiment our whatever we like. The problem is it will take some time to raise and the army would object.
ASM – “. That’s all there is to it””
Well that explains everything then doesn’t it.
ASM – “I do support the enlargement of PASKAL”
I actually don’t. For the reason that keeping things small maintains a certain quality. Expanding the unit would lead to a lowering of standards/quality as only so many of the people who attempt selection will succeed and the last thing we’d want is to be forced to lower requirements in order to meet the numbers.
It’s for these reasons that the Brits maintain the small sizes of the SAS and SBS – to maintain quality even if it results in the units being overtaxed: as they were in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Aussies and the Kiwis also keep their SAS small in order to maintain a certain quality.
There is also the fact that various roles needed for our littoral environment do not require a special operations trained person. These roles require a person to be well trained for certain types of niche ops in a certain environment that requires a certain type of training but he doesn’t necessarily have to be “special forces” trained.
@ azlan
Each of the divisions in sabah and sarawak should be adequately armed but only up to a point. We must balance the forces to ensure that we do not upset the status quo of forces deployed to the borneo island. Currently most of our priority there other than the situation in South China Sea, is preventing a rerun of Lahad Dato, and to patrol our vast border with Indonesia. In the near future, Borneo will be the site of Indonesian capital city, and that will come with increased security on the indonesian side. My opinion is that we should not have permanent units stationed in Sabah and Sarawak armed with MBTs, Tracked IFVs or MLRS. Prepositioned equipment makes those equipments available, but not on the ORBAT. If it is needed, units from West malaysia trained for that equipment will be sent and those equipment brought out to be used.
Training of units such as 155mm howitzers could be done at an improved Kota Belud Range, or live firing can always be done as PUSATRI. That should not prevent the unit from doing maneuver training in sabah and sarawak.
As for the “amphibious” unit. Let me rearrange my description of it. Basically my vision for this is not to a a conventional marine corps like the indonesian, thai, US, korean or russian marine corps. This force is to be designed as an anti-amphibious invasion force, to fight any forces that tries to land on malaysian shores from the sea. So it is not designed to do large scale landings from LPDs and AAV7 like our 10 PARA training stints with the USMC. It is actually made to be the OPFOR for such a landing. Why i would like the force to mirror the Swedish , Finnish or Norwegian Coastal Jaegers. Like a mechanized battalion who rides in a IFV, this force would ride around in CB90s. It is already in the plans to double the size of PASKAL, so what i propose is for the additional PASKAL force to be moulded into our own Coastal Jaegers.
http://i.imgur.com/0Q21GIj.jpg
http://www.youngpilots.se/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/20170921_matnys02_Amf1_AURORA_2Amfbat_Mysingen_formation_169.jpg
http://assets.shockpedia.com/app/uploads/2016/02/19174418/maxresdefault.jpg
http://www.dockstavarvet.se/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/cb-90-h-sweden-04.jpg
So this is another part of the total littoral area denial plan that i am thinking of.
Hi Marhalim, do you know whether the FACs will get new missiles after the upgrades? As it is, MM38s are already obsolete. I cannot imagine the FACs operating for another 15 years with MM38s, even if there are rewired. I think the bare minimum for them should be MM40 Blk 2 but I understand the launchers for that are quite different from the MM38s right?
…. – “Each of the divisions in sabah and sarawak should be adequately armed but only up to a point.””
Before we even talk about TOEs in East Malaysia we must first ask what’s the current threat and how will it evolve in the coming years.
Is what we do in East Malaysia capability driven by the natural need to build our our capabilities there or threat driven? Or it is a combination of both?
Events in the Spratlys should they turn bad would be an air and sea affair. The Philippines neither has the desire nor the capability to take Sabah by force. Even if at some point in the future they decide they want to take Sabah by force (extremely unlikely) the capabilities needed will take a lot time to be gained. In the unlikely event we are faced with another Lahad Dato type scenario the present force levels in Sabah are more than adequate.
That just leaves Indonesia. The possibility of future trouble over Ambalat and things spilling over into land in the Tawau/Tarakan area.
… – “Training of units such as 155mm howitzers could be done at an improved Kota Belud Range, or live firing can always be done as PUSATRI””
Where it’s done is secondary. The important thing is to have a range in which manoeuvre and live artillery firing up to 155mm can be performed. I constantly bring this up because it’s a vital factor.
…. – “It is already in the plans to double the size of PASKAL, so what i propose is for the additional PASKAL force to be moulded into our own Coastal Jaegers””
Expecting a unit to perform too many roles is not ideal. It dilutes things. For me such a unit is to perform various roles in a littoral environment specific to our requirements; whether garrisoning the Spratlys or as a fast rapid reaction reserve.
This unit does not have to be a “special operations unit” per see..
Student,
– The MM-38s were retired about a decade ago.
– There were feasibility studies/plans in the f990’s to subject the FAC fleet to a full
SLEP. Nothing came of it and that time has past.
– Any plans to upgrade the FACs are conditional on whether it’s worth spending more than the absolutel minimum: given their age and current condition. Will it be a good return of investment or will the cash be put to better use elsewhere? For quite a while the idea was to just spend the bare minimum needed to keep them operational until they can finally be retired/replaced.
@ azlan
” Is what we do in East Malaysia capability driven by the natural need to build our our capabilities there or threat driven? Or it is a combination of both? ”
For this i am discussing mainly of our land formations in sabah and sarawak. Yes it should be a combination of both. My aim is mainly to have a parity in capability to the indonesian land forces currently stationed in kalimantan, the Kodam XII/Tanjungpura in west and central kalimantan (near sarawak) and Kodam VI/Mulawarman in north, east and south kalimantan. Another is to have an overwhelming superiority against any non-state actors thst can come in from the philippines. We should also increase our interoperability with brunei, having more exchange officers, more frequent joint exercises in sabah and sarawak and probably creating a joint HADR/peacekeeping force for the borneo theatre.
…. – “overwhelming superiority against any non-state actors thst can come in from the philippines””
We already have that.
The problem with non state actors was and is detecting them before they enter and intercepting them before they reach Philippines waters. By right it’s the police’s GOF which should be a main agency along the the coastal belt: tasked with dealing with such threats when or if they land.
@ azlan
” We already have that ”
We are lucky that they attacked a felda village. It would be a different scenario if they attacked kudat or sandakan town for example. We need to have an overwheming superiority to prevent something like marawi from happening on our soil.
“We are lucky that they attacked a felda village. It would be a different scenario if they attacked kudat or sandakan town for example. ”
There was a viking style raid on Lahad Datu in 1985.
In the 1980s, there were several instances of Indonesian pirates landing on coastal Singapore and robbing people. The sea border is not long. The problem was a lack of resources and the short distance to numerous populated islands. The pirates had a short distance to sprint and large amounts of local boat traffic to blend into before they struck- it was common for Indonesian traders to cross the border and supply provisions to those working on smaller Singapore islands. Even if the authorities detected the pirates, they would have had short times within which to react.
“We are lucky that they attacked a felda village”
In the 1980’s they attacked a town and made for the Chartered Bank branch.
…. – “ We need to have an overwheming superiority to prevent something like marawi from happening on our soil.””
No ….
We need to have adequate patrol assets (planes, surface units, sensors and UASs – all fully networked) operated by various agencies which are all under a clear chain of command.
That’s what we need. Not : “overwhelming superiority” ….
“Overwhelming superiority” (which is not lacking BTW) isn’t always the answer and is useless by itself without several key prerequisites being met. “Overwhelming superiority” which we’ve always had is useless if not in the right place, lacks early warning and operates under a muddled chain of command ….
Whether it was dealing with pirates in the 1980’s, kidnap gangs (many not Abu Sayaf per see but linked) or the “Royal Sulu Army” in 2013; the problem always has been in detecting them and preventing them from doing what they intend to do before getting away ….
With the exception of the “Royal
Sulu Army” all the other gangs/syndicates/groups were motivated by cash. Their intent was to get in and out as fast as possible whilst avoiding trouble.
@ azlan
Why do you equate superiority = only firepower?
Excellent situational awareness also contributes to superiority. Why i suggest the army ISTAR regiment with weapon locator radar and UAVs, semisubmersible floating bases, and the coastal jaegers as eyes and ears prevent any attempt of landing in malaysia before they manage to step foot on malaysian soil.
On getting used oil and gas OSV.
A lot of countries do this.
UK
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/HMS_Cornwall_Alongside_RFA_Diligence_MOD_45152167.jpg
New Zealand (for hydrographic survey)
http://www.janes.com/images/assets/118/89118/p1745531_main.jpg
Australia
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e7/ADV_Ocean_Shield.jpg/1280px-ADV_Ocean_Shield.jpg
Brazil
http://www.naval.com.br/blog/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/NSS-Guillobel-K120-3.jpg
And a few built brand new ones based on OSV designs, like france, china, usa.
…. – “Why do you equate superiority = only firepower?””
Why do you assume I do?
In the when others go gaga or place emphasis on “firepower” I’ve constantly stressed that l”firepower” on its own is not a panacea. Thus how would you
assume I’m equating “overwhelming superiority” with “firepower” ….. ?
We already have “overwhelming superiorly” in manpower, firepower and assets …..
…. – “Excellent situational awareness also contributes to superiority””
I’m fully aware of that. Which is why in the past when others place emphasis on the actual assets; i constantly say that it’s not the actual asset that makes the difference but the “systems” ….
And why I wrote this in a previous post ….
“We need to have adequate patrol assets (planes, surface units, sensors and UASs – all fully networked) operated by various agencies which are all under a clear chain of command”
…. – “he coastal jaegers as eyes and ears prevent any attempt of landing in malaysia before they manage to step foot on malaysian soil.””
I’m aware of the rationale behind such a unit but I don’t see the point in having the unit be an expanded part of PASKAL for the reasons I previously laid out …..
For me the unit will trained to operate in a variety of roles specific to our littoral environment. To do certain roles better that other others and to take the strain off PASKAL which for want of anything else is forced to perform roles which ideally can be performed by another unit which doesn’t have to be a “special forces” unit per see ……..
Personal opinion, our rmk12 will see our development funding for military equipment would be halves and opex budget would see no increase. Unless we source new needed equipments from much cheaper source like China or brasil or pakistan or get used ones from Western source, it would be impossible to fulfill most of the items discussed here. With the expectation of subdued growth next two years and deficit maybe increased by 50% compared to 2019 level, defense will be the obvious choice for cut.
@ azlan
” don’t see the point in having the unit be an expanded part of PASKAL ”
Why not? It has already started anyway. What can be done is to do 2 tiered force, similar to our 21 GGK. The current KD Panglima Hitam would be the SF force, with new coastal jaeger regiments acting like GGK 21 and 22 Commando, but with an emphasis of littoral/brown water/gator warfare. Only those that has served in the coastal jaegers would be recruited for KD panglima hitam.
@ kamal
It can be done. Our defence spending is not done on loans like some of our neighbours do. I believe oil prices will sooner or later pick up, and we can open our economy faster than compared to singapore or indonesia. If we prioritize, like getting more cheaper MMEA OPVs instead of Kedah class OPV or even LMS, converting our CN-235 to MPA instead of buying new, adding used OPVs as stopgap, we can more than able to fulfill all of the plans within the meagre budget that we have.
kamal – “used ones from Western source””
Certain things we should get pre-owned, some we shouldn’t.
Factors like commonality and long term operating costs are our prime concern. We shouldn’t rush into anything irrespective of how great the paper advantages are as we’ll end up paying the penalties in the long run.
We also can’t make the assumption that just because others face no issues in getting operating pre owned stuff; that it will be same for us as there are varying factors at play.
kamal – “it would be impossible to fulfill most of the items discussed here”
Why is why for me; I’d be happy for a start if the stuff agreed to by the previous government gets funded.
….
I’ve explained at these points before.
– For this new unit of yours; people do not necessarily have to be “special forces” trained. Roles this will conduct will include a variety of tasks which do not fall under the “special operations” remit.
– Notwithstanding plans to expand PASKAL; only a small percentage of recruits make it pass selection and there’s a limit as to how many attempt selection in the very first place.
– Expanding a unit sound easy but the only way to do this is to increase the number of people who attempt selection (the RMN is small to begin with) or to lower standards …. It’s for this reason that the Brits keep the SAS and SBS small : to maintain quality. Same with the Aussie and Kiwi SAS.
– PASKAL can conduct initial training (like Gerak Khas and 10 Para) but this new unit doesn’t have to be part of PASKAL which is a special operations unit and has a high fall out rate.
Reply
I don’t think Paskal training cohort is large enough to train people outside its own need.
@ azlan
” For this new unit of yours; people do not necessarily have to be “special forces” trained ”
Exactly why i suggest this:
What can be done is to do 2 tiered force, similar to our 21 GGK. The current KD Panglima Hitam (the current PASKAL force) would be the elite SF force like 11 RGK, with new coastal jaeger regiments acting like GGK 21 and 22 Commando, but with an emphasis of littoral/brown water/gator warfare. Only those that has served in the coastal jaegers would be then recruited for KD panglima hitam (current PASKAL).
So there should not be an issue of all of the new enlarged PASKAL (or whatever you want to call it) needs all of the people that has to go through the original training system. If the GGK selection system can provide manpower for 3 regiments worth of people (then with only those in 21 and 22 Cdo to be further recruited into 11 RGK), i dont see why something similar cannot to be implemented for the navy force.
And raising this enlarged PASKAL force would be more up to the purpose to prevent adversary amphibious landing, rather than ideas of raising a marine brigade (and what high costs that it would entail).
Reply
The marine brigade was just a proposal that never got approved. It is a dead end
Marhalim,
You could be right. It’s a small unit with limited manpower.
There are only so many people who enter the RMN annually. Of these only so many attempt PASKAL selection and only so many make it.
For PASKAL to expand; it either has to increase the number of men trying to join the unit or to lower entry standards to meet the needed numbers.
This is a problem faced by most similar units worldwide – meeting the needed numbers and also maintaining quality. The army has it a bit easier as more people are selected for the army than than the RMN. Gerak Khas has a larger manpower pool to draw from. Even then many years ago it has to stand down one of its sub units because it simply didn’t have the manpower. Gerak Khas also has a larger command/administrative/training element compared to Paskal.
… – “Only those that has served in the coastal jaegers would be recruited for KD panglima hitam.””
The problem is the manpower that joins the RMN annually and those that apply for certain postings and actually succeed is limited …..
At the moment any new recruit in the RMN can attempt PASKAL selection. Assuming we do as you suggest and allow people from this “coastal jaegers” to try for PASKAL; first there must be enough people in the unit. I would actually start with a company sized unit with HQ and supporting elements but when this would be an effort.
If the unit is struggling to meet its numbers; the unit’s officers will try their best to create obstacles as all their best material will be lost to PASKAL; to the detriment of this unit.
One way to getting around the army objecting and the RMN’s manpower and other constraints is to get the army into the picture. Get an existing army unit and have it retrained to conduct ops in a littoral environment ….
Whether to garrison the Spratlys, as a recce or fact reaction element or for other tasks. This way everyone’s happy – the RMN does not intrude on the army’s turf by having such a unit of its own, PASKAL’s resources are not further strained and it does not have to compete for manpower and the army can request for additional allocation for this unit whist safeguarding its turf (yes inter service rivalry and infighting is still an issue).
BTW Gerak Khas has long had a riverine/costal unit equipped; Anaconda. An existing army unit, preferably one of 10 Para’s sub units can be tweaked to perform a littoral/coastal role; in extremely close cooperation with the RMN.
@ marhalim
” The marine brigade was just a proposal that never got approved. It is a dead end ”
Remember in our Kertas Putih Pertahanan, there is still a stated requirement for ” kemampuan keupayaan amfibi “. I am suggesting this as an alternative to people who thinks kemampuan keupayaan amfibi = marine brigade. There is a lot of people who are still pushing for a marine brigade ( fully equipped with amphibious IFVs, LPD and such) which IMO is a wrong and expensive way to create a force that should defend malaysia from an amphibious invasion, not actually do an amphibious invasion itself.
@ azlan
” Assuming we do as you suggest and allow people from this “coastal jaegers” to try for PASKAL; first there must be enough people in the unit ”
Of course there must be enough people in the unit for that to happen. To raise a bigger PASKAL unit, bigger intake with lower requirement would be used to fill the ranks of the coastal jaegers. Or basically most of those volunteered for PASKAL can be absorbed into the coastal jaegers, with those who passed the second selection stage can continue for PASKAL selection.
As for the use of 22 Cdo SBS/Anaconda Sqn, this is just a subset of the whole team, at best a sqn/company worth of operators.
For the coastal jaeger force. I was thinking of
– at least battalion sized force. Probably 5 company worth of force, with 1 stationed in the spratlys.
– CB90s to be integral part of the force. They will fight with the CB90 like the mechanized force using IFV to fight. Which means we would need additional CB90s.
– to use floating bases like the semisubmersible floating base to operate out from.
– able to do maritime raid style missions.
– to have its own ISTAR assets, such as spynel-x IRST for surveillance of the littoral area. Sometimes small boats cannot be detected by radar.
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201910/thermal-sensor-maker-hgh-launches-new-360-degree-optical-system-for-u-s-army-market
This would operate in tandem with existing forces operating in the littoral areas like ESSCOM.
Reply
It’s a dead end even with the DWP
…. – “. If the GGK selection system can provide manpower for 3 regiments worth of people (then with only those in 21 and 22 Cdo to be further recruited into 11 RGK””
The army has a much larger pool of recruits to draw from compared to the RMN. Even then the bulk of our units are not at full authorised. Thus you cannot assume that because the army can do it, that the RMN can ….
…. – “And raising this enlarged PASKAL force would be more up to the purpose to prevent adversary amphibious landing, rather than ideas of raising a marine brigade””
Again – all for the reasons I’ve given enlarging a unit which is already small to begin with and has only a limited number of recruits; is a major problem. How many recruits you figure the RMN draws in annually? How many of those recruits try for PASKAL and how many succeed?
To significantly expand PASKAL either has to have a larger manpower pool to draw from or to lower standards in order to meet the numbers – either one. No other way around it.
… – “to the purpose to prevent adversary amphibious landing””
The prime purpose of this unit is not to “prevent adversary amphibious landing” ….
To do that there are various other assets in place, to work in unison for this purpose. The purpose of this unit is to operate in a littoral environment; performing various roles such as coastal recce, garrisoning the Spratlys, a rapid reaction unit, etc.
In other words doing slightly different roles compared to PASKAL and enabling PASKAL to do away with roles that it – as a special operations unit – shouldn’t be doing.
… – “ther than ideas of raising a marine brigade (and what high costs that it would entail)”
It was merely one of various ideas that eventually died a natural death. It would have entailed inter service rivalry being put aside (higher chance of dogs flying): considerable financial investment from the government and a whole host of training, administrative, promotion, staffing and other issues that would have taken years.
The army would have objected as this would be (from a service centric viewpoint) infringing on its turf and it would have worried that some of its funds would have been diverted for this unit. The RMN neither has the manpower, money or training resources for such a unit.
Sure PASKAL could have helped with some of the training but in the long run this would have affected the unit as its numbers are small to begin with.
So can anyone explain how on earth is TLDM doubling the current size of PASKAL (now with 2 battalion sized units in lumut and sandakan, plus 1 company sized detachment in sepanggar) ?
http://www.airtimes.my/2018/09/26/anggota-paskal-akan-ditingkat-dua-kali-ganda-panglima/
Reply
If you read the story its says akan.
@ marhalim
So you are saying Tldm “akan” double the PASKAL force without having the means or plans to do it?www.utusanborneo.com.my/2018/11/18/pusat-latihan-paskal-bakal-kemudahan-terbaik-di-rantau-ini
Anyway, at last TLDM has released the official story and pictures of OPS ROTAN
http://www.navy.mil.my/index.php/informasi/berita/berita-utama/item/5301-op-rotan-mengiringi-pflng-dua
http://www.navy.mil.my/index.php/informasi/media/gambar/event/OPROTAN-MengiringiPFLNGDua
Just look at how small KD Lekiu is when sailing beside tbe PFLNG Dua.
Anyway escorting it home is one thing. Protecting it from CCG harrasment now it is home is another…
….. – “So can anyone explain how on earth is TLDM doubling”
Like I kept saying; either PASKAL has a larger manpower pool to draw from or it lowers its requirements. No other way around it.
Expanding such units and the associates problem is an issue for almost everyone. Not just us. Maintaining quality whilst also expanding is a major headache. I suspect that calls to expand PASKAL comes from certain quarters and not from the unit itself.
Even the army with a much larger pool of manpower and other resources had to stand down a intel battalion and a Gerak Khas regiment years ago due to manpower and other issues.
…. – “So you are saying Tldm “akan” double the PASKAL force without having the means or plans to do””
Won’t be the first or last time that politicians or others with little understanding of how things work and the limitations the services work under; expect the services to do certain things without providing the needed means.
Significantly expanding PASKAL will be a long term commitment depending on several prerequisites being meet. Look
at how long it took to stand up 10 Para and other units. Years ….
… – “2 battalion sized units in lumut and sandakan, plus 1 company sized detachment in sepanggar“
Never mind the authorised paper strengths; what are their actual strengths and with regards to PASKAL what exactly does a “battalion and company” size unit really mean?
Like other units PASKAL will have its share of people who serve in command/administrative/support elements. Some will also be away from the unit serving at FOC and other places. Some will for whatever reason; prematurely leave the unit or be kicked out.
TOEs are useful and can be impressive to look at but they don’t give a true picture of things as they only show authorised not actual strength. They also don’t indicate what is the actual rifle strength or the combat and non combat ratio.
No doubt the British army has much greater resources than us but compared others; it’s under resourced and operates on a shoe string budget. It’s a wonder how units like the SAS (which are intentionally kept small to maintain quality) can keep up with the workload; especially years ago when the unit was heavily committed to Afghanistan and Iraq; as well as having other commitments.
… “Anyway below a great read on the Iver Huitfeldt, the basis of the Type 31 frigate. https://2018.f.a0z.ru/06/16-6377877-105.png”
The article mentions “tough choices” made in the name of cost cutting. One measure being trade-offs to achieve commonality with the Absalon class, a benefit for the Danes but of no relevance to us. There is indeed concern among the Royal Navy that the Type 31’s price may be too good to be true.
It should be noted that the Iver Huitfeldt/Type 31 will be a second or third tier vessel in the context of a Nato or Royal Navy force structure, but your proposal is for the type to be our most capable combatant. How well can it fight and survive, not being limited to lower threat environments and without the support of more capable units? If we can specify a configuration that works out for us, how much will it cost?
You get what you pay for, after all. An example would be the latest “high end” Russian frigates and corvettes, which pack large quantities of new weaponry but have a lower level of systems integration and build quality. These measures are not sexy or even tangible, but are very relevant to the performance and survivability of a ship.
@ AM
Have you really read the whole article, or just that 1 page? Unique solutions for the ship that really is on par with ships like AAW version of FREMM of much more higher costs, if we want to equip it that way.
http://forums.airbase.ru/2018/01/t91978_10–vms-danii.html
https://www.ft.dk/samling/20141/almdel/fou/bilag/20/1417702.pdf
Look at page 7 of the pdf. The total cost of Iver Huitfledt is usd325 mil. Of course it is due to only 12% is the weapons (guns and missiles) cost as it is transferred from older ships, with only the 35mm CIWS is new. But all the AAW system is new, and consist of 31% of the ship cost.
The Type 31 yes it is to be a 2nd tier frigate below the Type 26/Hunter. It is so because of the low armament and radar equipment. We can equip it to a better level of equipment then the Royal Navy version of the Type 31 at a price of less than usd400 mil each. And it would still be one of the most advanced in our neighborhood.
My proposed spec for the ships:
NS200 radar
1x 76mm super rapid (canibalized from Laksamana/kedah/korean OPV)
2x 40mm DARDO (canibalized from Laksamana/korean OPV)
8x NSM
32x CAMM
4x RHIB boats or 2x RHIB plus 2x USV (USV can tow sonars and launch torpedoes)
1x UAV
1x ASW helicopter
Can we afford an advanced version of the Type 31? Yes we can as it can be had for similar price to our Gowinds.
Can we afford top tier frigates like FREMM, Type 26? No we don’t.
AM – “You get what you pay for, after all”
Indeed.
The type of steel specified, level of DC standards; levels of automation and redundancy.
Ultimately of course – the funds aside – a displacement of a ship, how it’s fitted out, etc; boils down to the actual operational requirements of the user.
Just like how different users will make different trade offs with MBTs and IFVs; different users will make the same with ships. Dependent on what they feel should be a priority and what shouldn’t.
…. – “2x 40mm DARDO (canibalized from Laksamana/korean OPV)””
For me it’s not a matter of whether it’s cannibalised or brand new but it’s intended purpose …..
It’s secondary gun but is it intended to supplement the main gun by providing some level of anti air capability (albeit a limited one) and against asymmetric threats (a reason the Lekius, Kasturis and LCs have their 30mms) or is it intended as a last for or defence against any ASM leakers? For me, it should be a CIWS in that it has the ability (through ROF or ammo) to be able to deal with any ASMs that make it past the missiles and chaff.
… – “8x NSM””
It should have option – either through stacked canisters or the deck space – to enable an additional 8 launchers to be added should a need arise.
Since the ship will be operating in a littoral environment and the threats it may face might be asymmetric with little warning time; I would like for certain areas of the ship; namely the bridge, armoury and hangar to be fitted ballistic panelling which will provide some level of protection
against small arms fire and splinters.
Ultimately whatever the specs; it’s ability to function and survive will be highly dependent on the level of networking it has; not only with other ships but also with other assets.
… – “Can we afford top tier frigates like FREMM, Type 26? No we don’t.””
The pertinent question really is do our threat perceptions and requirements actually call for a “FREMM, Type 26” …..
@ azlan
A new school of thought is moving towards a bigger calibre for CIWS purposes. Royal Navy is moving towards BAE 40mm mk3 for CIWS function to replace the phalanx 20mm. I believe the DARDO (installed both in front of the bridge and on top of the hangar), coupled with latest radars with advanced gun tracking function (like the NS200) and electro-optic fire director, will give a potent CIWS capability for the ship.
” The pertinent question really is do our threat perceptions and requirements actually call for a FREMM, Type 26 ”
I am saying that because some comments that the Type 31 is a third rate frigate when compared to FREMM or Type 26. To me, the question is about what is the best affordable frigate to be a replacement for our Lekiu and kasturi classes? What other missions that we need to do in the future that our Gowinds cannot do better, and we need to have in a new frigate? What i am thinking of for Lekiu/kasturi replacement
– to act as our flagship, just like jebat is right now
– able to act as a command ship for task force operations (malaysian or multinational)
– to have a bigger sphere of awareness/influence compared to the gowinds by having embarked UAVs and USVs
– higher anti-air performace than gowinds. Better ranged radars and more missile loads. Not up to anti-air warfare destroyer standards, but can give protection to other ships in its vicinity.
– while gowinds are optimised for ASW, the Lekiu/kasturi replacement would have the defence of our SLOC as a priority, undertaking long range escorts of our merchant ships, and conducting effective blockade/shipboarding operations.
On the topic of OSV vessels for TLDM Auxillary fleet.
US had just bought a brand new off the shelf unit on behalf of Chile Navy for just usd11 million. The vessel has a length of 70 m, a beam of 18 m, gross tonnage of 3200 tons and deadweight tonnage (DWT) of 2500 tons.
http://defpost.com/india-lt-awarded-11-5-million-fms-contract-us-navy-ahtssv-vessel-chile/
https://i0.wp.com/defpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/LT-AHTSSV.jpg
off topic
hi res pictures of egyptian gowind
http://www.naval.com.br/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Gowind-2500-1.jpg
http://www.naval.com.br/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Gowind-2500-2.jpg
http://www.naval.com.br/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Gowind-2500-3.jpg
https://i.pinimg.com/originals/bd/00/9c/bd009cae26f7437300157201c828ffdd.jpg
https://i.redd.it/s890jwded6h11.jpg
With french lafayette frigate
… – “give a potent CIWS capability for the ship.””
What will really make a “potent” (I prefer the word “effective”) CIWS will be the ammo and the amount of early warning a ship has which in turn is dependent on the level of networking or connectivity it has.
On the actual system different navies have different ideas as to that will work. It really boil down to early warning and also the type of threat : is it subsonic one employed in conjunction with standoff jamming or is it a supersonic one performing evasive manoeuvring? Also, is the CIWS the sole last means of defence or is some level of soft kill options being employed?
…. – “– while gowinds are optimised for ASW””
You keep mentioning this but despite their ASW load out they are still to all intents and purposes “multi role” platforms.
…. – “– able to act as a command ship for task ””
This is actually of secondary importance. Not as if we’re conducting task group level ops thousands of NM from out shores; requiring the space for command elements to be embarked.
In our context for our operational level and within our operating areas; our existing ships have sufficient command/control facilities for our needs and can be adequately handled by shore bases elements
…. – “I am saying that because some comments that the Type 31 is a third rate frigate when compared””
Fine.
All I’m saying is that before we even discuss whether we can or can’t afford something; the first question to be asked is do we actually have an operational need for it (whatever it is).
@ azlan
” It really boil down to early warning and also the type of threat ”
Of course. Why I talked about NS200,
http://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/database/document/2019-11/NS200-V04.pdf
Why i said it would have more air defence missiles than the gowind. One thing i did not say is about jammers. I believe a frigate the size of Type 31 should have its own jammers, like Korean Sonata SLQ-200K, Turkish AREAS-2N or Thales Scorpion 2. Jammers can add another layer of defence to hardkill and softkill measures for incoming missiles. It could also be used as non-lethal means to attack or disturb the enemy, by degrading their communications, GNSS and radar systems.
” Not as if we’re conducting task group level ops thousands of NM from out shores ”
We need to have the ability to protect our SLOC and merchant ships. We had to do this before (Ops Fajar which is thousands of NM from our shores) and we would need to do this again in the future.
” the first question to be asked is do we actually have an operational need for it (whatever it is) ”
I have always stated my justification for all my plans. Isn’t that an answer to your questions on operational need?
…. – “We need to have the ability to protect our SLOC and merchant ships””
We the need ability to do a long list of things. It boils down to placing emphasis on the things we’re most likely to do whilst having plans in place for a host of other contingencies.
….- “We had to do this before (Ops Fajar which is thousands of NM from our shores””
That was a one off thing.
Ultimately the wear and tear on our ships and the fact that we needed them in home waters meant we had to pull them back.
…. – Isn’t that an answer to your questions on operational need?””
If it was I wouldn’t be re emphasising the point …. You asked whether we could theoretically afford something. I merely said that before we ask that of anything we first have to ask whether we actually have a requirement for it.
…. – ‘l believe a frigate the size of Type 31 should have its own jammers””
A ship of any displacement should have a jammer if there’s a need for it and if it can be properly employed in combination with other systems/assets …..
The problem with active jammers, like EW as a whole, is that there’s no “one size fits it all
solution”. “Jammer Z” might be effective against “threat X” but it won’t be effective against “threat y”.
We face the same problem many others face: the lack of a local industrial base means we have to rely totally on what others are selling and what we can afford. What we buy may or may not be effective for specific threats. Another problem – not only with jammers but EW as a whole – funds are needed for periodic upgrades.
Another problem with jammers is that they themselves are subject to being jammed or disrupted. There are also missiles with “home in jam” technology.
@ azlan
” We the need ability to do a long list of things ”
I agree on this. Why imo we should have a different frigate for our lekiu/kasturi replacement that can excel in different tasks when compared to our gowinds.
…. – “ excel in different tasks when compared to our gowinds””
For me its not about excelling.
I see the need for a better armed and slightly bigger platform compared to the LCS; due to the fact that the threat environment is rapidly changing and that the LCS (being modestly armed and having little deck for space improvements) might not be able to do what is required of it.
The problem of course is not the actual platform per see but our ability to operate this platform in conjunction with fighters, subs, MPAs, UASs, etc, that will make the difference.
The platform (whatever it is) should also be one we can operate without blowing too big a hole in our pockets, one that shares as much commonality as possible and one whose design, displacement and fit out reflects the types of threats most likely to be encountered.
One reason I’ve stressed that before we even talk about Batch 2 LCSs; we must first ask if the RMN actually has a requirement for it … Requirements and threat perceptions evolve and in a few years we might not have a need for anymore LCSs based on the existing design.
@ azlan
” I see the need for a better armed and slightly bigger platform compared to the LCS ”
I believe this is the first time that you have said this. I have looked around and IMO there is no platform that is bigger and better armed than the LCS but smaller than the Type 31 (3500-5000 tonnes frigate) that can be had for a price similar or cheaper than the gowind. The closest is the DW3000 for thailand at usd484 million, and other than the ESSM, it has quite a similar capability to our gowinds.
https://i.imgur.com/MGNHeca.jpg
The FTI/Belharra, which is to be a cheaper frigate than the FREMM, costs usd800 million from the Greece order for two. One thing i see lacking from the Belharra is the absence of a CIWS gun system (Gowinds will have the main 57mm gun as its CIWS system).
https://i.imgur.com/1KhuHwf.jpg
” The problem of course is not the actual platform per see but our ability to operate this platform in conjunction with fighters, subs, MPAs, UASs, etc, that will make the difference ”
This is a given, everything need to have interoprability in mind. What is different is the actual individual platform itself.
” The platform (whatever it is) should also be one we can operate without blowing too big a hole in our pockets, one that shares as much commonality as possible and one whose design, displacement and fit out reflects the types of threats most likely to be encountered ”
Why I believe the Type 31 is a sweet spot, with low acquisition and operational costs. As a platform for show of presence in South China Sea, it has the size, endurance, and ability to deploy future UAV, USV and UUVs.
” One reason I’ve stressed that before we even talk about Batch 2 LCSs; we must first ask if the RMN actually has a requirement for it ”
This, i believe we do, but for a total of 9 ships to afford 3 ASW configured ships to be always at sea. What i do strongly feel is that the RMN should have no further business in OPV type of ships, and this should be left to MMEA, as MMEA already been provided the adequate budget to buy cost effective coast guard specific OPVs, most that can be had for less cost than the RMN LMS68.
… – “I believe this is the first time that you have said this””
Not really. If you care to look at previous postings I’ve lamented the fact that the LCS only has a 16 cell VLS with no free deck space for add ons and it has no CIWS.
I’ve always believed the LCS is modestly armed “but” I keep stressing that it’s a product of not just our financial capabilities but also our threat perceptions and operational requirements.
I also keep stressing that we should only place follow orders for LCSs and AV-8a if the respective services actually have a need for them; not to benefit BNS and DEFTECH …..
… – “What is different is the actual individual platform itself.””
No …………
Things have long progressed from a platform centric to a system centric level. Which is why I keep stressing that it’s not the actual platform/ship/UAS that makes the difference but the networking.
Take fighters for example. People go gaga about the technical specs; turning radius, range, lift capacity, etc, but these are of secondary importance. Same with a ship and it’s load out, radar range, number of missiles, etc.
You can have a less than ideal
platform but if it’s operating in
conjunction with other assets in a fully networked environment it will perform better than a more ideal platform performing by its own with minimal or no networking.
… – “What i do strongly feel is that the RMN should have no further business in OPV type of ships, and this should be left to MMEA””
You keep mentioning this and it’s plain as day but the hard fact is that until the MMEA is sufficiently funded; the RMN has to continue performing roles that by right or shouldn’t have to : full stop/period.
… – “ 3 ASW configured ships to be always at sea.””
I have no idea what you mean by “ASW configured” ships ….
As I pointed out the LCS is not “ASW optimised” (as you’ve mentioned in the past) : it’s configured for littoral operations in a low to medium threat environment.
Even if a ship has a hull and a VDS/towed array, helo and torps; this doesn’t necessarily make it “ASW optimised”. Just like how a ship with a 32 cell VLS isn’t really “AAW optimised”.
What makes that distinction is the level of ASW training it gets and the harsh reality is that navies like the RMN can only spend so much time on ASW training for the reason thar they are under resourced and ASW is resource intensive.
@ azlan
” Things have long progressed from a platform centric to a system centric level ”
This is a given. If you always say this, then everytime there is a topic of little birds, LCS, LCA or anything, lets just discuss about the networking part, about SDR radios (do you know enough to discuss this), datalinks, BMS, CMS, satcom antennas, troposcatter radios etc. Years ago I even suggested about land-based CIC for LMS to have more situational awareness and data-infusion but i don’t see you want to discuss more on that.
Still individual platforms still matters. Why for TUDM I suggest AWACs and airborne jamming aircraft in RMK13 2026-2040. Why I suggest a fully gempita Brigade for example. Why I suggest instead of TLDM NGPV batch 2, we should have more MMEA OPVs.
” but the hard fact is that until the MMEA is sufficiently funded; the RMN has to continue performing roles that by right or shouldn’t have to : full stop/period ”
I don’t mind RMN doing constabulary roles. What i do mind is the disconnect between the future plan of 15 to 5 and Pelan Perancangan Strategik Maritim Malaysia 2040 (PPSMM 2040). I do mind why TLDM still plans on buying ships that can do only constabulary roles. If you look at both 15 to 5 and PPSMM 2040 plans, there is a total of 38 large OPV and 12 Frigates in there!!! Can we even afford to run 50 large ships?? Budget is limited, and we should not spend it on things that is not value for money, like NGPV and LMS68. MMEA has been given adequate budget (arround usd100 million annually) to expand its fleet of OPVs. It takes time, to have the fleet up to its planned numbers, but i believe it can be done by 2030, and i believe TLDM should really take out all OPV plans from its 15 to 5 plan,
” I have no idea what you mean by “ASW configured” ships ”
A frigate, with a hull and a VDS/towed array, helo and torps, with just an air self defence capability, has always been called a anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigate. A ship without a VDS/towed array, is called a general-purpose (GP) frigate.
For example, the description of Royal Navy current Type 23 fleet
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_23_frigate
From the total of 13, 8 of them are equipped with Type 2087 towed sonar are called the ASW Frigate, 5 without are called a General Purpose (GP) frigate. Exactly why I called the Gowinds an ASW optimised frigate, as i am comparing it to the Type 31 to be a GP Frigate (and not a AAW frigate). An AAW frigate should have a long range radar, and a long range air to air missile system to be called one.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FREMM_multipurpose_frigate
Also look at the FREMM frigate. Only ASW versions has the Captas4 VDS towed array. those without is called a GP frigate.
” RMN can only spend so much time on ASW training for the reason thar they are under resourced and ASW is resource intensive ”
Another reason why those precious resources should not be wasted on NGPV batch 2s or LMS68s.
By the way marhalim,
Any news on the Vibrant 01 Combat Management System (CMS) installation on the KD Jebat? It was supposed to be completed, tested and fully operational by end of last year. If it performs as good as it is supposed to, it should be rolled out to other TLDM and MMEA ships too.
” While the CMS selected for the Lekiu-class frigate upgrade are fully military specs compliance, MCT also presented at LIMA a marine standard based on “Commercial off the shelf” (COTS) components which will “effectively be much cheaper than the MILSPEC model” said Admiral (Ret.) Kamarul, the former Chief of Navy, who is the Group Advisor of T7 Global ”
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/more-details-on-cms-upgrade-for-lekiu-class/
A bit off topic, below is a video of the SOFRESUD IPD device to be installed on the Maharajalela class frigates
http://www.seaowltechnologysolutions.com/video/SOFRESUD-Video-IPD-2018.mp4
Reply
Nothing on the Jebat new CMS, everyone are wary talking about it though I am told that there were teething issues with the system. As expected for a new system.
… – “Why I suggest a fully gempita Brigade for example””
Your suggestion aside; I’m first asking whether the army actually has a need – for the near future – for another AV-8 unit? It probably wants to concentrate on other areas first and as far as IFVs are concerned has indicated (as much as anyone personally disagrees) a need for 6x6s.
… – “to, it should be rolled out to other TLDM and MMEA ships too“”
Given that MMEA ships do not have the same level of sensors and weapons as RMN ships, do they even need a CMS?
As it is not all RMN ships have a CMS for the reason they don’t need one.
@ azlan
I am of the opinion that even something like the Damen 1800 OPV needs a CMS, to fuse all the data from Radar, EO, ESM and AIS feed into a single picture and able to remotely control all the weapons on board of the ship. As do something like the FAC. So having a low cost and proven system would be a good starting point.
…. – “So having a low cost and proven system would be a good starting point.””
Depends on individual users.
For some ships; navies feel there is no need. The FACs entered service with a just a fire control, the Marikhs never had a CMS and the pair of training ships have an integrated bridge system that in some ways performs like a CMS.
…. – I even suggested about land-based CIC for LMS to have more situational awareness and data-infusion but i don’t see you want to discuss more on that”
You are talking a shore based C3 set up. I’m talking about things at an operational/tactical level. Doing as you suggest entails resources that can be first better employed to ensuring units at sea have better connectivity in other to produce better results, i.e. ships connected to each other and MPAs, a ship with a broken radar still able to get a radar feed from another ship, a ship having its radar coverage extended because it’s linked to a MPA.
Having a shore base set up as you suggested doesn’t necessarily lead to improvements at sea. It certainly does improve SA but not necessarily to those who need it. It can lead to more micro managing (a problem we have) and will consume resources in the form of manpower (we already have bloated HQ set ups with doesn’t contribute to efficiency) and bandwidth. Given that resources are tight; priority should be not with such a shore based structure but in improving things at sea ….
… – “ i don’t see you want to discuss more on that”
So? Does everything have to be discussed. Do you need acknowledgment? Does the fact that i didn’t discuss it means what I’ve mentioned on the need for networking (at a time when most are still gaga in the specs of the actual platform) isn’t complete?
… – “Still individual platforms still matters””
They matter but it’s how you employ them, how they’re structured and how well they can perform with supporting assets that makes the actual difference.
Nice to talk about how this UAS has x load and x speed or x price : irrelevant if one does not deploy it in such a way that the info it provides is made available to those who need it in a timely manner without bureaucratic delays … BTW this is a common problem faced by many.
You can talk about your AV-8 brigade all you want (nobody’s stopping you); I’ll continue to say that forming the brigade is the easy part. The not so easy part being the need for radical structural/organisational changes to ensure that supporting assets are available when needed instead of being hogged by a higher command authority.
You can have the best equipped IFV but if engineering assets are not there when needed this AV-8 can’t perform. Having it attached at divisional level makes it nice and neat from an administrative level but it’s not the most ideal way; especially when assets are limited to begin with.
Which is why I’ve constantly stressed the need for not just the cosmetic part but also the vital importance of having the needed engineering, signals and logistics assets to be organised the right way and to be available when needed.
…. – A frigate, with a hull and a VDS/towed array, helo and torps, with just an air self defence capability, has always been called a anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigate“”
Thanks for taking the time to explain what (on paper) constitutes a ‘ASW platform” but the LCS is not “ASW optimised (as you think) and just because a ship may have a particular load out that on paper enables it to be classified as such; doesn’t necessarily mean it’s so …..
It’s the doctrine, availability of other assets and the level of training that really defines a ship’s core role and its ability to perform it ….. A Type 23 is a ASW platform not only because it has torps, a helo, towed array and an electric drive but because in line with the RN’s long focus on ASW; ships actually make it a priority to practice ASW.
” load out that on paper enables it to be classified as such; doesn’t necessarily mean it’s so ”
Wow, seriously? So we cannot call the Gowinds ASW Frigates because you assume TLDM is not going to practice on that?
… – “Exactly why I called the Gowinds an ASW optimised frigate, as i am comparing it to the Type 31 to be a GP Frigate””
You are making paper comparisons. The LCS isn’t anymore a “ASW optimised” frigate than anything we currently operate – furthermore the RMN doesn’t see it as such and has never indicated as such. The only thing it’s “optimised” for is shallow water operations in a low to medium threat environment.
It is a “multi role” platform; despite having a better ASW capability compared to other ships by virtue of having CAPTAS. Itseffectiveness as a ASW platform will also be dependent on the type of helo it has; the helo being the main means to engage and eliminate threats some distance away from the ship.
… – “ (do you know enough to discuss this), datalinks, BMS, CMS, satcom antennas, troposcatter radios etc””
I will readily admit I don’t know “enough” but I do know “enough” to the point where I keep harping about the importance of connectivity/networking (plus the respective merits) when others keep harping about the technical merits of individual platforms despite it now being 2020 (when we’ve been in end “systems” era age for quite a while): rather than 1955. I also know “enough” to mention to you (some years back) that data links have actually been around for decades (the Swedes were pioneers); when you at one point suggested it was a relatively new thing. We’ve also had them in some form or another for decades actually.
Since you’ve mentioned “ datalinks, BMS, CMS, satcom antennas, troposcatter radios”
and asked whether I know “enough” (I most definitely don’t) I’ll throw the question back to you : do you know “enough” beyond what one can learn from a fast Google search? If you do, please by all means fill in a gap in my education (that goes beyond posting links) I’m always eager to learn – no sarcasm intended.
connectivity/networking/situational awareness is important
data links have actually been around for decades
I can also mention this in each one of my post. But how can those statement be used to improve our future defence? If you want to suggest how to, i am all for it to discuss. But you keep on telling the obvious without saying how to improve this.
Like SDR, it has been rolled out in almost all of our systems down to individual soldiers for our FSS. I know of the high importance of this, that even some large countries like India has not done anywhere close to what we have done right now. What SDR radios can do which analog radios cannot, is to pass data similar like dedicated datalinks. So you can have chat systems like SMS or pass radar data, or pictures through SDR radio.
http://scdn.rohde-schwarz.com/ur/pws/dl_downloads/dl_common_library/dl_brochures_and_datasheets/pdf_1/M3AR_bro_en_0758-1970-12_v0501.pdf
Like INS which is in most of our armoured vehicles and fighter jets which enable us to navigate in GPS-denied environment. Most other armies have INS only on howitzers for quick geolocation, but not on every IFVs and MBTs, which is what we are doing.
So basically for all new systems, connectivity/networking is always a high priority for our armed forces. I know of a lot of systems that is put into the AV8 gempita for example, that will give it a high degree of connectivity/networking. But i rather not discuss it openly. Yes of course you could improve it by adding more stuff like gunshot locator system, or very small satcom antenna like the slingshot.
http://www.joint-forces.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/SlingShot-Equipped.jpg
If anyone wants to discuss on this, how we can improve our connectivity/networking i am more than happy to.
…. – “But you keep on telling the obvious without saying how to improve this”
But you keep falling back to the same script script again by insisting and implying that only you provide value in your comments. This is telling …. You did this previously when you hit a brick wall during our discussion on combined arms; which you insisted was only possible if one had tanks and weren’t even aware we had been practicing this for a while ….
In what way I can I have provided examples as why we need to improve on our level of networking and how it will benefit us by enabling us not only to improve SA but also enabling us to get the best in term is the capabilities offered by what we operate. If you think that this isn’t sufficient enough or that you can do better : no skin of my back.
With regards to then”obvious”; what about when you keep telling the obvious? The …. pot shouldn’t be calling the Azlan kettle black…
…. – Like SDR, it has been rolled out in almost all of our systems down to individual soldiers for our FSS“
No it hasn’t. It remains something we’d like to do but just haven’t.
… – . I know of a lot of systems that is put into the AV8 gempita for example, that will give it a high degree of connectivity/networking“”
Having such systems in place of fitted in various things and us actually using it or having the ability to use those systems with other similarly equipped assets are a profoundly different thing.
…. – “n, but not on every IFVs and MBTs, which is what we are doing””
In paper yes …. In reality they are under utilised and we don’t or haven’t yet been able to use them to the level we’d like …
…. – “But you keep on telling the obvious without saying how to improve this.””
Actually I have. If you’d care to look and not be so selective in your narrative …… Long ago I’ve been insisting that we have to make changes by transiting from a platform to a systems centric organisation. Not only that but as part of the install discussion on various things; I’ve long stressed that networking is the key to being able to use these assets to their maximum potential.
What I haven’t done is adopt the condescending and self serving patronising attitude that me and only me alone is providing any value in my comments and insisting time and again that others should follow my script
Practice what you preach. Since you questioned whether I knew “enough” (why I I don’t); you demonstrate you know “enough” every-time you discuss something. By your reasoning not doing so doesn’t provide value to the conversation
” insisting that we have to make changes by transiting from a platform to a systems centric organisation ”
Yeah i can also say i insist the airforce to plan better for example. But how to?
If you want to discuss about systems centric organisation then how do you want the military to do it? How much would it take to do it? Show us how it can be done better. By using what. With what units. To enable us to achieve what.
So lets do this and every topic we need to say ” we need to have a systems centric organisation “. So what is the end result of this? Without any mesurable plans or actions offered?
” You did this previously when you hit a brick wall during our discussion on combined arms; which you insisted was only possible if one had tanks and weren’t even aware we had been practicing this for a while ”
I hit a brick wall? I am not aware we do combined arms maneuver? I don’t think so. What I meant is we don’t have a specific combined arms unit, like a combined arms brigade.
https://www.malaysiandefence.com/capability-demonstration-4th-mechanised-brigade/
– Apart from funds the main stumbling block is convincing senior officers and bureaucrats as to the imperative and value of improving our network centric abilities. Like others; they are still in the platforms level age and slowly or haven’t come around to the fact that things have changed…
– Like with SATCOM we’ve had data links for years now – contrary to the misconceptions of some; it’s nothing new. As far back as the 1970’s the Spicas were wired and so were the Laksamanas with Link Y in the late 1990’s as well as the Lynx’s. What’s new is the availability and the things we can now do that was not previously possible.
– We are already making the first steps towards this direction and are starting things in the order of priorities. In the army we’ve had a SATCOM ability for quite a while now and GAPU has been the most networked followed by army HQ.
-The RMAF has long made it a priority to instal a common data link between the MKMs and Hornets; without which we won’t able to fully utilise them; irrespective of their technical merits on a platform level. This is something I keep repeating – stating the “obvious” (to quote ….)
The next step would be to wire the fighters and ground based radars as well as with AEWs when or if they ever come. At the cost of stating the “obvious” I will do so again by stating that we will only be able to exploit our fighters to the fullest when we have them wired to a AEW.
.- Having increased connectivity also entails a change of mindset and more ”jointness” (as it is this remains a major problem). Service parochialism and infighting can be an obstacle; i.e. a RMAF MPA must not only be connected but also to work with a RMN ship (why I’ve stressed that having mixed RMAF/RMN MPA crews is a must). Another example of “jointness” would be GAPU’s TRA-3Ds being able to share feeds with RMAF radars.
– The downside of having increased connectivity is to have the means/infrastructure to support the needed bandwidth, the means to deal with the need for increased bandwidth and the needed budget. Connectivity comes with increased costs. Another downside with increased connectivity (much more info in manner) comes with the urge to micro manage things. Which is why priority should be on things at a tactical/operational level rather than at a HQ level. Unfortunately with the increased connectivity will also come the urge to create new command elements which might not necessarily lead to greater efficiency; more bureaucracy out of existing ones.
– Even when we reach a point where networking has become an essential part of ops; we’ll still maintain the ability to do without it as it can be disrupted and is non passive. Just like how certain people still train to use morse in case comms breaks down and how each ship still has a compass and plotting table in case it’s navigation system breaks down.
” to the fullest when we have them wired to a AEW ”
Why we must plan for an AEW as soon as possible. I belive if we plan carefully, we can have them by RMK13 2026-2030. Why we still need to plan for platforms.
” Another example of “jointness” would be GAPU’s TRA-3Ds being able to share feeds with RMAF radars ”
Actually GAPU is the main coordinator of all ground based air defence systems. The issue with GAPU radars, is that it is not continuously deployed. We need to have our GBAD to have some units always deployed, probably on rotation and at always in different location. As for the maritime domain, why we need a frigate with substantial command facilities, to be able to be the command centre for both surface, subsurface and air operations say in South China Sea. The Su-30MKM should be able to be flown regularly as a part of the airborne strike and air cover for the ships on the surface. MPAs should be able to take command from the frigates and transfer data in real time.
” Even when we reach a point where networking has become an essential part of ops ”
Why we must start looking at alternatives and think outside of the box, like non radio communications using laser beams, communications and data through the electrical grid, using underwater telephone to transfer data between surface ships to avoid ESM, etc.
…. – “I hit a brick wall””
When you do you fall back to the same script. Insisting others do as you go by coming up with their own fantasy/alternative TOEs.
… -“ don’t think so”
Well only you will know what you really think.
At one point you insisted that one can’t perform combined arms without tanks and seemed unaware that we’ve long practised such training; long before we even got out first IFVs.
As far back in the 1980’s we already started practicing combined arms training with the Scorpion, Sibmas and Stormer.
As I’ve mentioned Bosnia was a wake up call and a major influence in how we later did things. The MALBATT/MALCON “battlegroup” (as we called it) was a self contained unit with integral mech companies, recce platoon (Condor), ATGW platoon, mortar platoon, signals squadron, supply company and HQ element.
…. – “What I meant is we don’t have a specific combined arms unit””
What do you think 4th Mechanised Brigade is? How do you think the dismounted infantry operate and how do the various configured Adnans go about supporting the infantry and vice versa? What kind of tactics do you think dismounted paras practised with their Scorpions and Stormers? Not to mention the AV-8s in various configurations when operating alongside and in support of dismounted infantry.
Even if we don’t have such a unit (which we do) per see; doesn’t mean we don’t practise the capability. The RMN doesn’t have a “mine warfare” school per see but it has MCMVs ….
Also, watch videos of Ex Stallion and Satria Perkasa. What tactics do you think are practised when vehicles adopt over watch positions and when dismounted infantry go about their business whilst supported by vehicles?
Instead of links I occasionally post the titles of books I feel are worth reading.
These 3 deal with naval network centric warfare, tactics and asymmetric tactics. Worth a read.
“Network Centric Warfare” (Friedman)
“Anti Access Warfare” (Tangredi)
“Fleet Tactics” (Hughes)
Sekejap you say must have all units organic (artillery, engineering, logistics) in a brigade is a must to be a true combined arms… When I plan for that same thing then you say temporary battlegroups with ad hoc placing of units pon okay…
Whatever floats your boat lah.
Read all you need about theories. No use if you cannot apply it in a way it can be used to improve our defence for the future.
Put it in whatever way you like, i hit a wall, whatever… Yeah I kalah. So what?
First and foremost my only intent here is to put out alternatives that could seriously improve our defence and our security. If that means ignoring you from now on, that is what i am going to do.
…
Is that the best you can do?
Frustration brings a heavy hand ….